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The Equal Pay Act of 1963 generally prohibits employers from
discriminating on the basis of sex by paying employees of opposite
sexes unequal wages for equal work.1 Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'2 The Supreme
t Professor of Accounting, Economics, and Finance, Graduate School of Management,
University of Rochester. In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I was a policyholder elected trustee (1977-81) of the College Retirement Equities Fund ("CREF"), which
along with its senior organization, the Teachers Insurance and Annuities Association
("TIAA"), is a principal codefendant in a number of lawsuits involving allegations of sex
discrimination in annuity programs. See infra note 7. My wife and I also are members of a
principal coplaintiff organization in these suits, the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU"), and we donate fairly heavily to the ACLU Foundation. In fact, we are likely to
be beneficiaries of a prohibition against sex-distinct annuity tables for TIAA-CREF annuities, should the courts so rule, because we teach at perhaps the only university that does not
require that contributions to retirement funds be deposited in TIAA or CREF regular annuity accounts. Since July 1976, we have put all our tax-deferred retirement contributions in
CREF Supplemental Retirement Accounts ("SRAs"), which can later be withdrawn or
"rolled-over" into other annuities rather than used to purchase TIAA-CREF annuities.
(TIAA-CREF pension plan annuities permit only up to 10% of the accumulations to be
withdrawn in cash at retirement.) If unisex annuity tables are mandated, my wife will
purchase a unisex annuity with her funds, thus taking advantage of receiving greater periodic benefits than her actual life expectancy would allow, and I will withdraw my funds and
place them with an insurance company or group that uses male life expectancy tables to
calculate annuity payments. These latter annuity plans will be available to groups that do
not discriminate but are in fact populated by males. See the discussion infra notes 151-58
and accompanying text for further explanation.
1 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). The section provides in pertinent partNo [subject] employer ... shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis of

sex by paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex ... for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under
similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity
or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.
I Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
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Court's application of these statutes in City of Los Angeles v.
Manhart4 has invalidated the practice whereby employers administering their own pension plans required female employees to
make larger pension contributions than similarly situated male employees in order to receive equal periodic payments upon retirement.5 By implication, Manhart also seems to invalidate the
equivalent employer practice of providing lower periodic retirement payments to women whose pension fund contributions were
equal to those of their male counterparts.
The practice invalidated in Manhart was based on the fact,
acknowledged by the Court,6 that women, on average, live longer
than men. This is the same fact that leads insurance companies to
pay out less to female annuitants than to male annuitants of the
same age for any given unit of a purchased annuity, and to charge
men a higher premium than women for a given amount of life insurance issued at a given age. Several lower courts are now addressing the implications of Manhart for pension plans administered by private insurers rather than by employers; most notable
are suits7 involving the fully-vested annuity programs administered
by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association ("TIAA")8 and

3

Title VII's ban on sex discrimination with respect to "compensation," see supra text

accompanying note 2, subsumes the Equal Pay Act's ban on sex discrimination with respect
to "wages," see supra note 1. The Equal Pay Act's four statutory exceptions, see supra note
1, were specifically incorporated into Title VII by the "Bennett Amendment," Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(h) (1976). Thus the Equal Pay Act survives,
ironically enough, as a source of possible defenses to actions alleging violations of Title VII.
In City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), the appellant municipal department
thus argued that its pension plan differentiated among employees with respect to longevity,
a "factor other than sex" under the incorporated provisions of the Equal Pay Act. Id. at
711-13 & nn.22-24.
4 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
' The "defined benefit" plan in Manhart provided for a monthly retirement amount
computed as a fraction of an employee's salary multiplied by years of service, so that the
periodic amounts paid to men and women of the same age, seniority, and salary during their
lifetimes were equal. Id. at 705.
8

Id. at 704.

"See EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139 (1st Cir. 1978); Johnston v. Purdue Univ.,
No. L80-4 (N.D. Ind. filed Feb. 5, 1980); Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 476 F. Supp. 1343
(E.D. Mich. 1979); Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), motions for relief from judgment denied, No. 74 Civ. 1674 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 19,
1982); Michigan State Univ. Faculty Ass'n v. Michigan State Univ., No. G76-640 (W.D.
Mich. filed Dec. 15, 1976); American Nurses' Ass'n v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, No. C75-558-G (M.D.N.C. filed Dec. 31, 1975); Bailey v. University of S. Cal., No. 75-3862 (C.D.
Cal. fied Nov. 17, 1975).
8 TIAA is a nonprofit legal reserve life insurance company established in 1918 by the
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. It provides retirement and insur-
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the College Retirement Equities Fund ("CREF"), 9 which are offered primarily to employees of colleges, universities, foundations,
and other educational and research organizations. Thus, the central issues in Manhart are still very much alive.
Insurers' use of sex-distinct mortality tables gave rise to a
number of scholarly articles and notes before Manhart;10 this commentary made its way into the Manhart briefs,' and certain of the
12
arguments evidently influenced the Supreme Court's decision.
Manhart in turn has provoked further debate, 3 most notably
ance plans for educational institutions and their staff members.
9 CREF was created in 1952 as a companion organization of TIAA to permit diversification into equity securities.
10 See, e.g., Bailey, Hutchison, & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance
Classification, 25 DRAKE L. REv. INs. L. ANN. 779 (1976) (discussing the historical, conceptual, and practical bases for classifications and concluding that, in the context of insurance,
discrimination is not necessarily illegal because antidiscrimination laws are concerned with
unfair discrimination, not discrimination per se) [hereinafter cited as Bailey group]; Bernstein & Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classificationsin Pension Programs,74
COLUM. L. REv. 1203 (1974) (determining that Title VII requires employers to provide or
purchase equal benefits for men and women); Gold, Equality of Opportunity in Retirement
Funds, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 596 (1976) (concluding that Title VII requires contributions to,
and benefits from, retirement funds to be equal and that the cost of female longevity should
be spread among all employees); Lines, Sex-Based Fringe Benefits-Annuities and Life Insurance, 16 J. F m. L. 489 (1978) (finding that Title VII currently bars disparate treatment
in employee benefits, but concluding that the question is one of policy that Congress should
resolve); Developments in the Law-Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1166-86 (1971) (concluding that Title VII requires evaluation on an individual basis rather than a prediction made based on a sex-defined group, but recommending adoption of a statutory exception that allows equal premium contributions by an employer, with unequal benefits, or that extends the sexdiscrimination ban to the insurance industry in general) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; Note, Sex Discrimination and Sex-Based Mortality Tables, 53 B.U.L. REv. 624
(1973) (recommending that Congress bar the use of sex-segregated mortality tables by insurance companies) [hereinafter cited as B.U. Note]; Note, Equal Protection, Title VII, and
Sex-Based Mortality Tables, 13 TuLSA L.J. 338 (1977) (concluding that Title VII requires
equal contributions and equal benefits); see also Comment, Gender Classifications in the
Insurance Industry, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1381 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Comment]; Note, Sex Discriminationin Employee Fringe Benefits, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 109
(1975).
'" See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 19 (citing Developments, supra note 10); id. at 33
(citing B.U. Note, supra note 10); Brief for American Nurses Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 15 (citing Gold, supra note 10).
"I See 435 U.S. at 711 n.21 (citing Developments, supra note 10).
IS See, e.g., Bernstein & Williams, Sex Discriminationin Pensions:Manhart'sHolding
v. Manhart's Dictum, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1241 (1978) (concluding that Title VII bars consideration of a work force's sexual composition to determine any benefit plan's funding requirements because the use of unisex tables for only employer-operated plans would provide a
disincentive to hire women); Freed & Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency and the Equality of Men
and Women: A Revisionist View of Sex Discrimination in Employment, 1981 AM. B.
FouND. RESEARCH J. 583 (arguing that Manhart was wrongly decided because use of sex-
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Spencer Kimball's fine critique of the opinion, 4 and the strong
counter argument by Lea Brilmayer, Richard W. Hekeler, Douglas
Laycock, and Teresa A. Sullivan recently published by this
journal. 15

I argue in this article that the scholarly commentary that supports the Manhart opinion is seriously flawed, particularly in its
conception of the value of the fringe benefit "insurance" to the individual. More importantly, I contend that Justice Stevens based
his majority opinion in Manhart on the incorrect premise that periodic pension payments or insurance premiums that are based on
sex-distinct mortality tables are unfair to individuals because
"[m]any [individual] women do not live as long as the average man
and many [individual] men outlive the average woman."1 In the
course of my analysis, I consider the demographic arguments made
by the Brilmayer group and find many of them to be erroneous.
Finally, I argue that the maintenance and extension of the Manhart principles would be inconsistent with the congressional demand, expressed in the statutes, for equal treatment of individual
employees with respect to sex. By focusing on the economic attributes of insurance-based fringe benefits, I hope to demonstrate
that employee pension, annuity, and life insurance plans that do
not use sex-distinct mortality tables in fact violate the Equal Pay
segregated mortality tables is justified by efficiency considerations); Key, Sex-Based Pension Plans in Perspective: City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 2 HARv.

WOMEN'S

L.J. 1 (1979) (concluding that Manhart has restricted significantly

the use of sex as a risk-classification factor in employee group insurance but that other,
more far-reaching questions remain to be decided by Congress, the state legislatures, and
the courts); Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe-BenefitPlans, 65 VA. L. REv. 199 (1979)
(concluding that the Manhart principle abolishing sexual classifications in fringe-benefit

plans is workable and correct, even though the result is unequal treatment of the sexes).
14 Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination:Manhart, 1979 AM. B. FoUNi.
RESEARCH J. 83
(concluding that the Manhart principle should be limited because it is based on the erroneous assumption that the Equal Pay Act and Title VII bar discrimination between the sexes,
rather than discrimination against a person on the basis of sex) [hereinafter cited as Reverse
Sex Discrimination];see also Kimball, Reprise on Manhart, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 915.
15 Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock, & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHi. L. REv. 505 (1980)
(arguing that use of sex-based actuarial tables is illegal because the principle of Title VII is
equal treatment of individuals, rather than equal treatment of groups, and challenging the
widely accepted view that the relationship between sex and mortality is unchanging and
uniform) [hereinafter cited as Brilmayer group]; see also Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination as "ActuarialEquality". A Rejoinder to Kimball, 1981 AM. B. FouND. RESEARCH J.
221.
16 435 U.S. at 708.
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Act and Title VII.
I.

UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS

My analysis rests on some basic assumptions that are best
stated explicitly at the"outset to avoid misunderstandings. First, I
assume that the goal of both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII is to
have individuals treated equally with regard to their race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin in the sense that these personal
attributes will not be treated invidiously. Thus the law does not
prevent employers from distinguishing among individuals with respect to these attributes as long as the distinctions are demonstrably germane to the tasks for which a person is employed and do
not mask otherwise illegal discrimination. 17 I base this assumption
on a recognition that individuals naturally differ and that some of
these individual differences may be related to race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin. If these differences are not taken into account in a noninvidious way, affected individuals may be harmed
or benefited as unfairly as if the differences were considered
invidiously. 18
Second, I assume that because the listed personal characteristics in the past have been, and possibly continue to be, the bases of
unfair discrimination, their use in employment and other decisions
is suspect. Therefore, those who use the criteria have the burden of
demonstrating that such use is not based on bias and does not result in unfair discrimination against individuals.19 In this article, I
accept the burden of showing that insurers' use of sex-distinct
mortality tables for calculating the benefits from annuities and life
insurance is necessary to avoid unfair treatment of people with respect to their gender.
Third, I assume that the Equal Pay Act and Title VII are not
designed to reallocate resources in favor of persons of one sex, or
otherwise to benefit or harm persons because of their gender.20 As I
11See Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination,supra note 14, at 103-05, for a more complete discussion. See generally Rutherglen, supra note 13, for a comprehensive description
and analysis of the legal interpretations of racial and sexual discrimination.
1, See Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and PreferentialTreatment: An Approach to the
Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 581 (1977), for a discussion with which I largely agree.
10 Freed & Polsby, supra note 13, discuss the precedents and arguments that lead them
to conclude that a per se prohibition of the use of an employee's gender is neither followed
by the courts, contemplated in the statutes, nor desirable. Id. at 586-87. I concur with this
conclusion. See infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
20 Compare the analysis offered by Fiss, A Theory of FairEmployment Laws, 38 U.
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discuss below,21 however, forbidding the use of sex-distinct mortality tables in calculating the benefits of annuities and life insurance
to an employee not only tends to reallocate resources on the basis
of gender, but also tends to work against females who seek employment. Thus, the Manhart decision has policy results quite opposed
to the goals that animated congressional action in this area.

II.

THE VALUE OF ANNUITIES AND LIFE INSURANCE TO INDIVIMUALS

A.

Individuals versus Groups

Almost all commentators and courts emphasize that Title VII
refers to individuals, not groups. For example, two of the earlier
commentators concluded: "In short, Title VII proscribes per se
classification on account of sex, [or] that sexual classification which
attributes to even a single individual a characteristic which he does
not necessarily have, but [Title VII] permits differential treatment
for pertinent characteristics the individual demonstrably possesses." 22 Professor Brilmayer and her colleagues also emphasize
this point, noting that Manhart relied on a disparate treatment
theory in which "the essence of the [legislatively targeted] wrong is
to ignore individual characteristics and treat individuals on the basis of group affiliation, as when an employer refuses to hire an applicant because he is black."s Justice Stevens's opinion in Manhart stated that:
[Title VII's] focus on the individual is unambiguous. It preL. REv. 235 (1971). He concludes, in relation to the prohibition of racial discrimination
in employment, "first, that the antidiscrimination prohibition is a strategy for conferring
benefits on a racial class-blacks-and, second, that as a benefit-conferring strategy it is
limited. It does no more than prohibit discrimination on the basis of race." Id. at 313. Considering the more limited societal demand for the elimination of distinctions based on gender discussed by Rutherglen, supra note 13, at 211, it seems clear to me that the statutes do
not represent an attempt simply to benefit females over males.
" See infra notes 136-50 and accompanying text.
2 Bernstein & Williams, supra note 10, at 1205 (footnote omitted).
11 Briimayer group, supra note 15, at 509 (footnote omitted). The distinction between
CHI.

individuals and groups is discussed id. at 508-11 and is reemphasized throughout the paper.
But the authors fail to distinguish between consideration only of individual characteristics
that may be related to group characteristics, and the unjustified assumption of group characteristics. Thus they say that the "most fundamental principle [of the main civil rights
tradition] has been that no individual shall be considered simply as part of a racial, sexual,
religious, or ethnic group, or treated differently because of his membership in such a group."
Id. at 508. The last phrase is not simply an amplification of the first part of the sentence. As
I argue below, refusing to treat annuitants differently because of their membership in sexual
groups can be inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the civil rights tradition. See
infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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cludes treatment of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class. If height is required
for a job, a tall woman may not be refused employment
merely because, on the average, women are too short. Even a
true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for
disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does
24
not apply.
The Manhart majority and most of the commentators, however, have incorrectly applied this correct statutory emphasis on
the individual in the context of pensions and annuities, because
they fail to understand what the individual employee gets when he
or she is provided with insurance-based fringe benefits.2 5 Justice
Stevens's analogy is particularly revealing: he evidently believed
that he could adumbrate what is wrong with using sex-distinct
mortality tables in employer-operated pension plans by referring
to an example of sexual discrimination in hiring. Professor
Brilmayer and her colleagues also make this mistake, citing the
"classic illustration . . . in which the employer refused to hire
women for certain manufacturing jobs because employees in those
jobs had to lift heavy weights. ' 26 Determining the amount of compensation that employees should receive in the form of fringe benefits, however, is very different from deciding what criteria are appropriate in hiring decisions. The real question concerning fringe
benefit compensation is whether it is unfair to pay men and women who are already employed different amounts because of their
gender. To answer this question, one must determine the value to
the employee of the fringe benefit in question.
Because they write for an insurance industry audience, insurance textbook authors and actuaries tend to explain insurance
from the viewpoint of the insurer rather than from that of the insured. Thus *they emphasize the mechanics of risk-sharing, which
necessarily involves the law of large numbers and aggregations of

2

435 U.S. at 708.

"I Notable exceptions are the Bailey group, supra note 10; Freed & Polsby, supra note
13; Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination,supra note 14; and Rutherglen, supra note 13.
The student authors of the B.U. Note, supra note 10, at 630, and Key, supranote 13, at 1315, appear to recognize the essential issue, though they are not as clear as the others. None
of these earlier authors, however, emphasized the essential economic issue as I would have
preferred. Perhaps for this reason they were not persuasive to the Brilmayer group, supra
note 15.
28 Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 510 (citing Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416
F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969)).
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individuals.27 To be sure, fairness to the insured is also stressed, in
part because it is required by most state laws regulating insurance.
These laws, however, usually describe fairness as the absence of
"unfair discrimination between persons in the same class. ' '28

From my reading of the legal literature and the Manhart
briefs, I believe that commentators, lawyers, and the Court have
been misled by these group-oriented descriptions of insurance. 9
They appear to confuse the production of the product with its consumption, and the costs of production to the insurer with the value
of the product to the insured. The following generalized description of insurance may help dispel the misunderstanding.
B.

Insurance Concepts and Individual Attributes

Insurance in general provides a means for people to purchase
compensation against the effects of the risk that some unwanted
event might occur. In the case of life insurance, this event is the
death of the insured; for annuities, the event is the impecunious
survival of the annuitant. Both events are unwanted in the sense
that, should they occur, the person or his or her beneficiary will
27 See, e.g., 1 J. GREiDER & W. BEADLES, PRINCIPLES OF LIE INSURANCE 8 (rev. ed. 1972)
("insurance spreads among large numbers of people the economic losses actually experienced by some members of the group from such hazards as fire, automobile collisions, and
early death"); see also B.U. Note, supra note 10, at 624 (citing, inter alia,S. HUEBNER & K.
BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE 34 (7th ed. 1969)) ("Insurance is a risk-spreading device based on
probabilities of loss, utilizing statistics grounded on group expectations."). Key, supra note
13, at 11 & nn. 77-79, gives almost the same description and cites the ninth edition of the
same text. The Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 508, also correctly states that "[t]he
insurance tradition analyzes risks, premiums, and benefit schedules in terms of groups; most
actuaries cannot think of individuals except as members of groups" (citing a TIAA-CREF
statement: "Insurance by its nature requires reference to groups.").
11 Bailey group, supra note 10, at 806. The authors summarize the state laws and regulations and discuss their histories and the implications of proposed changes that would prohibit or restrict classifications of risks. Id. at 806-07.
29 For example, Professor Brilmayer and her colleagues describe the purpose of sexdistinct mortality tables in these terms:
Consider an annuity plan with two thousand participants, half male and half female,
each of whom made equal contributions to the plan and retired at the same age. Proponents of segregated tables attempt to assure that the sum of all benefits paid to the
thousand men will equal the sum paid to the thousand women-that sexual groups will
be treated equally.
Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 508 (footnote omitted). Aside from an additional analysis
of the statutes and cases, leading to the conclusion that "unequal total payments to sexual
groups are legal," id. at 522-23, and an extended discussion of the empirical relationship
between gender and mortality, leading to a conclusion that these relationships are unreliable, id. at 539-59, this is the whole of the Brilmayer group's argument in support of Manhart and its extension to other employment-related pension plans.

1982]

Gender Discrimination

bear a cost. Should a person whose life is insured die, his or her
beneficiary can be compensated in part with a cash amount; should
an annuitant not die, the annuity provides resources (most often in
the form of a pension) that he or she can use to pay living
expenses.
To understand insurance, one must realize that the purchaser
of a policy is not buying the amount that will be remitted should
the unwanted event occur, but the promise that if the event occurs, the designated amount will be paid. Thus both the insured
who does not die during the period covered by the life insurance
policy and the insured who does have purchased and received the
same product. Similarly, after a life annuity contract has been executed, an annuitant who lives for thirty years and an annuitant
who dies the next day have both received the same product for
their money. Furthermore, if it were possible to predict exactly
when an event such as death would occur, there would be no insurers because there would be no risk to insure against. A person can
save for an event that can be precisely predicted and need not pay
someone else the administrative costs of assessing the probability
of its occurrence. Moreover, it would be unlikely that an insurer
could insure against the effects of such an event's occurrence at a
price the insured would be willing to pay. Therefore, insurance
necessarily involves circumstances in which the events insured
against will not be precisely predictable, and in which the payments made to individual insureds will not be equal.
Assuming that the risk of the event occurring has been correctly and efficiently assessed, the amounts charged for the insurance should equal the present value of the expected payments"°
plus the costs of administration. Otherwise, individuals are not
treated equally; there is discrimination in the sense that they are
charged premiums that are not functionally related only to the
product that they are purchasing, namely, compensation for the
effects of risk. It is necessary, therefore, to determine the expected
amounts that will be paid to the insured should the event in quesSOPresent

value refers to discounting the expected amounts of cash payments by a rate
that measures the opportunity value of cash. If cash can be invested to yield r percent (net
of changes in the purchasing power of funds) in all time periods (t), the present value of
future cash flows (c) received at the end of periods 1 through t equals
+
C2
+
+
Ct
=
[-10

C,

l+r

(l+r)'

(1+r)t

r

Thus, if the investment or discount rate is positive, the present value of the expected cash
flows is less than their value in the future.
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tion occur. This is what is meant by a "correct" assessment of risk.
Administrative costs also will be incurred. These include the costs
of making the necessary actuarial assessments (information costs)
and the costs of keeping the required records, monitoring insureds
so that false claims are not often paid, and informing insureds of
the alternatives available to them. The insurer and insured benefit
when the extra amounts spent on administration do not exceed the
extra value to the insured of the expenditures. This is what is
meant by an "efficient" assessment of risk.
From the insured's point of view, the means and factors used
to produce insurance are relevant only if they affect its quality or
price. In general, consumers need be concerned only with a comparison of the quality and price of alternatives; competition among
producers usually results in the optimal use of production procedures and factors. But if constraints are placed on the insurers
that prohibit them from using the optimal mix of productive factors, the insureds will be disadvantaged. In particular, if constraints forbid insurers from considering the characteristics of the
individual insureds that affect the cost of insurance, the result will
be invidious discrimination against some individuals and in favor
of others.
Therefore, all information that will enable the insurer to assess the probability that the event will occur must be used if one
insured is not to be unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged over another. To illustrate, consider a mutual insurance situation in which
a group of people agree to contribute to funds that will pay a lifetime pension to the group members who achieve a given age, and a
lump sum amount to the survivors of those who die. The task,
then, is to calculate how much each of them should contribute, so
that each pays a "fair" share-an amount that reflects only the
cost of the risk each person imposes on the group. Assuming for
now that there are no administrative costs, the group should use
all information that predicts any difference in the probabilities of
death of each member of the group. For example, if we know nothing about a member other than the fact that he or she smokes cigarettes, and if past experience indicates that, all other things being
equal, smokers die sooner than nonsmokers, we would use this information to determine the probability that the members of the
two subgroups will have different life expectancies. Experience has
shown, however, that other things are likely to be associated with
the life expectancies of the group members. For example, older
people tend to die in fewer years than younger people, although
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some older people outlive some younger people. And the past experience of the particular group may indicate that females tend to
outlive males, which generally has been found to be true, or that
whites tend to outlive blacks, which has not been found to be generally true for annuitants. 1
It is important to note that the assessment of the probability
that an event will occur is a prediction of the future. Therefore,
the experience of the past is of value only insofar as it provides an
accurate prediction of the future. To achieve this, the relationship
considered should be one that pertains to the specific group rather
than to some other persons who are not members of that group.
For example, the life expectancy of women may be adversely affected by the possibility of death in childbirth, but this event is
irrelevant for predicting the life expectancy of female annuitants,
because they are beyond the childbearing years when they attain
the usual retirement age. Similarly, for calculating life insurance
rates, the higher expected incidence of death among structuralsteel workers is irrelevant for estimates of the life expectancy of
college professors.
The relationship between an attribute of an insured and the
risk insured against should also be stable or predictable so that
there is a good likelihood that it will hold in the future. This requirement has three dimensions.
One is that the magnitude of the attribute's effect must be
measurable with sufficient accuracy to allow reasonably precise
predictions to be made, given the costs of administration associated with more accurate predictions. For example, the age at which
a person dies may be associated with his or her degree of nervousness. But the relationship may be very imprecise or have a very
wide range, so that even though the life expectancy of a more nervous person, all other things being equal, is two years shorter than
that of a less nervous person, there is still a ninety-five percent
probability that the two types of person will live the same number
of years. Thus, for any particular group over any reasonably finite
time period, it is likely that nervous and calm persons will experience the same life expectancy, although over many groups and over
a long period of time, the less nervous people will be found to have
lived longer. If administrative costs were zero, however, the expected difference would properly be considered even in a small
1' Evidence on these and other facts mentioned in this section is discussed below. See
infra notes 67-123 and accompanying text.
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group because there would be no cost incurred in identifying the
precise portion of the nervous who could be expected to die earlier.
The second dimension of stability and predictability is the expectation that the measured relationship will persist into the period when the benefits are paid. For example, though women may
in the past have experienced shorter life expectancies because of
childbirth deaths, that measured relationship between sex and life
expectancy would be irrelevant for predicting the life expectancy
of a female in the future if recent medical practice had sufficiently
reduced the incidence of death in childbirth.
Third, and in many respects most important, the attribute
must not be susceptible to selection by the insured for the purpose
of defrauding the group. This is the problem of moral hazard. For
example, there may be a reasonably predictable and stable relationship between the number of years and amount a person has
smoked and his or her life expectancy. But if there is no practical
way for the group to verify a person's claim to have been a nonsmoker or a light smoker, and if lower life insurance premiums are
offered to people who did not smoke or who smoked little, it is
likely that some past or present heavy smokers will deny their
habits.
Another aspect of this problem occurs when an attribute associated with life expectancy is not considered. Then the group is
subjected to adverse selection. For example, life expectancy may be
positively associated with a person's own perception of his or her
state of health and sense of general well-being. The person knows
this perception, but the group cannot. Therefore the group will
find that people who expect to live longer will purchase annuities,
and those who expect to die sooner will purchase life insurance.
For this reason, the group would be well-advised to base its predictions of life expectancy on its or others' actual experience with
self-selected insureds.
As suggested by the above, administrative costs are an important factor because the assessment of probabilities and the monitoring of claims is not costless. All useful attributes of the individual members of the group should be used to predict the occurrence
of events and the expected amounts that will be paid, provided
that the costs of the assessment do not exceed the benefits derived
from it. For example, assume that individuals' prior smoking habits affect the probability of their deaths, so that those who have
smoked two packs a day for ten years increase the probability of
their deaths at age sixty-five by ten percent, at age sixty-seven by
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twelve percent, and so on. (A complete schedule relating the
amount and period of smoking at various ages to the probability of
death at various ages would have to be constructed). As a consequence, one could calculate the present value of the expected
amounts that would be paid as annuities to these persons at and
after age sixty-five, as compared with the amounts paid to nonsmokers. Say that for a heavy smoker, these calculations call for a
reduction of $1200 in his annuity's cost because he could be expected to die sooner and collect less. But the cost of measuring
those relationships also must be incurred. And, often of greater importance, it is costly to establish the smoking history of a particular person. Because these administrative costs would be incurred
for the benefit of the annuitant who smokes, lowering his cost, they
should be charged to him. If these administrative costs exceed
$1200, the smoker would prefer not to pay them and not to have
the calculations made. Conversely, if life insurance were the product offered, and if the costs of assessing the higher probability of
an insured smoker's earlier death exceeded the amount of higher
premiums that would be charged the smokers, the nonsmokers
would be better off if the assessment were not made.
Therefore, the individual members of an insured group benefit
from the identification and application of relationships associated
with the occurrence of the event insured against only when the expected savings exceed the costs. In many instances this is unlikely
to occur, for several reasons. First, the assessments may be very
costly to make. Second, they may not be stable; as a consequence,
predictions of the amount of the expected savings may be too unreliable. Third, the costs of administering and monitoring the assessments so that the group is not defrauded by some of its members may be too great. For these reasons, insurers tend in practice
to make relatively few distinctions among individuals, and the individuals ultimately benefit thereby.
C.

Cross-Subsidization

A good illustration of the prevalent misunderstanding of insurance as a consumer product may be found in one of Justice Stevens's comments in Manhart. In speaking of group insurance, he
said:
[W]hen insurance risks are grouped, the better risks always
subsidize the poorer risks. . . . Treating different classes of
risks as though they were the same for purposes of group in-
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surance is a common practice which has never been considered inherently unfair. To insure the flabby and the fit as
though they were equivalent risks may be more common than
treating men and women alike; but nothing more than habit
32
makes one "subsidy" seem less fair than the other.
Professor Kimball cogently discusses one important misconception
revealed in this quotation: namely, that insuring people who
represent different risks for the same price "has never been considered inherently unfair." As Kimball points out, this practice may
indeed be unfair if other factors that are gained through group insurance, such as lower administrative and marketing costs, do not
offset the unequal risks of the participants, so that all are better
off, though some more so than others, with a group policy than
with individual policies.33
But Kimball does not go far enough, because he does not point
out that, from the viewpoint of the insured, there are really no
subsidies. The insured receives something of value, the right to collect a given amount if an event occurs, for which he or she pays
either directly or indirectly, by receiving a fringe benefit in exchange for work. The value of that contingent right to the insured
depends on his or her estimate of the probability of the event occurring and the relative desirability of cash now versus in the future. Whether or not someone else can obtain that good at a higher
or lower price-that is, whether or not the other's compensation is
lower or higher-is of interest only in two principal regards. One is
whether unequal compensation is paid for equal work in contravention of the statutes. The second involves a possible mutuality
among the insureds, as where the amounts charged and paid are
dependent on their joint experiences. This is the situation in mutual insurance associations and for group policies, in which the
premiums are based on the experience of the insured group. But
even in this situation, there are no subsidies as long as each insured has the freedom to obtain insurance elsewhere, but chooses
to be a member of the group because the advantages are preferable
to the alternatives. These advantages, and some disadvantages, are
considered next in the context of the employment situation.

32

33

435 U.S. at 710 (footnotes omitted).
Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination,supra note 14, at 106-08.
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D.

Calculating the Value of Insurance to an Individual Employee

To summarize, the value of any form of insurance to the insured is measured by the present value of the amounts promised
multiplied by the probability that the event insured against will
occur, where the probabilities are assessed as accurately as possible, considering the costs and benefits of making these assessments
and controlling for the effects of moral hazard and adverse selection. To this expected present value should be added a money
equivalent of the value to the insured of avoiding the effects of
risk. Thus, the actual amounts received do not measure the benefit
received by an employee who is granted insurance as a fringe
34

benefit.

One other important point should be mentioned before these
concepts are applied to the question of gender discrimination in
the use of sex-distinct mortality tables. The value of the insurance
fringe benefit to employees depends not on its cost to the employer
but on its subjective worth to the individual recipient. This is the
situation for any compensation not paid in cash. As an initial approximation, the value of a fringe benefit to an employee seems to
equal the number of dollars he or she would pay to purchase the
same benefit on the open market. But personal income taxes play
an important role because most fringe benefits, including annuities
A frequently stated misconception in the commentaries and Manhart briefs is that
the amount of annuity payments actually received measures the value of the fringe benefit
to the employee. (Rutherglen, supra note 13, at 248-49, and Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination,supra note 14, at 97-102, are important exceptions.) For example, Bernstein & Williams, supra note 10, equate the benefits of an annuity with the monthly amounts actually
received, arguing that "[i]f Title VII requires equality in benefits, it requires equality in
monthly benefits rather than actuarial equivalence for men and women over their average
lifetime." Id. at 1211-12. Similarly, Justice Stevens in Manhart incorrectly equated "benefits" with the amounts eventually received. 435 U.S. at 710 n.20 ("each retiree's total pension benefits are ultimately determined by his actual life span") (emphasis in original). The
Labor Department Wage and Hour Division's regulations for Title VII probably have contributed to this error. They provide: "In the area of employer contributions for insurance,
pensions, welfare programs and other similar 'fringe benefits' the employer will not be considered to have violated these guidelines if his contributions are the same for men and women or if the resulting benefits are equal." 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.3(c) (1981). This regulation
makes sense only if "the resulting benefits" are measured as described above, as the present
value of the expected periodic payments. (Even so, the regulations assume that the cost to
the employer is at least as great as the value of the fringe benefit to the employee. The
possibility that women or blacks value these benefits less when they are not immediately
vested is overlooked). If the "benefits" are taken to be the periodic payments, however, as
they were by the Wage and Hour Division Administrator and Justice Stevens, not only is
the word "benefits" misused, but the two amounts can be equal only where the life expectancies and other attributes of the employees are identical.
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and most other insurance, do not represent taxable income to the
recipients and, when purchased individually, do not result in deductions from taxable income, with the notable exception of taxdeductible contributions to Individual Retirement Accounts
("IRAs")35 and to Keogh Plan accounts.8 6 An annuity that would
cost $1000 on the open market is thus worth more as a fringe benefit to an employee in the fifty percent marginal tax bracket than to
an employee in the twenty percent bracket. But for several reasons
some employees may not initially value an annuity at the amount
it would cost them to purchase it. They may believe they can invest their funds at a higher yield, net of administrative and other
transaction costs, than the yield implicitly promised by the insurer.
They may prefer to have the cash now rather than in the future,
which is to say that they may apply a greater discount rate than
that promised by the insurer. Or they may assess a lower
probability than the insurer that they will live to collect the periodic amounts promised. In addition, if the pension offered by the
employer does not vest immediately, the employees will assess the
probability that they may not stay long enough to collect the
7
promised fringe benefits.3

It should be emphasized that the cost of the annuity to the
employer is irrelevant to the employee, particularly as concerns a
possible violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. But it is
likely that in most situations, the cost of an annuity or other fringe
benefit to the employer is less than its value to the employee, for
two principal reasons. One is the tax advantage to the employee."
The other is the lower price per contract charged by insurers to
employers because of administrative and marketing economies

'e

37

I.R.C. § 219 (West Supp. Nov. 1981).
Id. § 404(e).
Thus, the value of a fringe-benefit annuity to an employee can be determined as

follows: VA = (MA - (1-d) - p)/(1-t), where
VA = the value of the annuity to an employee;
MA = the market price at which the employee could purchase the annuity;,
d = the discount applied to the annuity when the employee values it at less than its
market value (d can be negative if an employee believes that the insurer can obtain a
higher return on funds because of economies of scale, diversification, and expertise);
p = the probability that the employee will stay long enough to get a vested right to the
annuity, when it does not vest immediately; and
t = the marginal personal income tax rate, because the annuity is nontaxed compensation. (This rate should be decreased sufficiently to account for the present value of
future taxes on the annuity principal. It also should be applied to MA if the person can
deduct from taxable income direct contributions to an annuity plan.)
38 Denoted by 1/(1-t). See supra note 37.
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from bulk or group contracts as compared to individual ones.3 9 The
major exceptions to this generalization involve young people, who
are likely to have high discount rates, and, where pension rights do
not vest immediately, 0 short-term employees. This last factor
should be considered with respect to possible Equal Pay Act and
Title VII violations. If the most effective predictor of an employee's acquisition of a vested right to a pension is his or her gender or race, 1 the total compensation paid is a function of these
attributes, and the compensation paid to those who are predicted
to leave before vesting would actually be lower than the apparently
equal compensation paid to others.
HI.

APPLICATION TO THE USE OF SEX-DISTINCT MORTALITY
TABLES

A.

Violations of the Statutes

I have argued that insurance providers must consider the personal attributes of insureds that are related to the expected
amounts promised and the administrative and monitoring costs
that are efficiently incurred. If they do not, some insureds will be
unfairly discriminated against. In particular, if an insured's gender
is an efficient predictor of his or her life expectancy, and if it is not
used to determine the amount that will be paid as an insurance
award or periodic pension payment, then the employer arguably
will have violated the Equal Pay Act'2 because the value of fringe
11 Van Alstyne, Equality for Individuals or Equality for Groups: Implications of the
Supreme Court Decision in the Manhart Case, 64 AAUP BULL. 150, 155 (1978), argues that
the major concern is benefit to the employee, not cost to the employer, but implies that the
value of the amount to the employee is not likely to be greater than the cost to the employer; he does not consider the tax advantages of receiving fringe benefits and the economies of group purchasing. Van Alstyne is cited approvingly by the Brilmayer group, supra
note 15, at 517 n.54.
4' The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), § 203(c), 29
U.S.C. § 1053(c) (1976), provides that amounts contributed by employees are 100% vested,
but that amounts contributed by the employer need not begin vesting until the employee
completes five years of service. The annuities provided by colleges, universities, and similar
organizations through TIAA-CREF are immediately vested and are portable. The employees
"own" their accounts: when they die, their heirs obtain the amounts credited thereto, including earnings.
41 For example, if women and blacks tend to leave before their benefits fully vest, their
compensation is lower than that paid to men and whites, all other things being equal.
42 The fringe benefits of insurance and pensions are clearly compensation or "pay" to
the employee. There is some question whether they are considered "wages" as that term is
used in the Equal Pay Act. See supra note 1. Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination,supra
note 14, at 98-99, and Bernstein & Williams, supra note 10, at 1211, 1214, agree that the
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benefits to its employees will be affected unfairly due to the employees' gender classifications. Thus, assuming for now that, all
other things being equal, women are expected to live longer than
men,43 granting the same periodic life pension to a male and a female employee of the same age who do the same work gives lower
present compensation to the male than to the female. If the same
amount of life insurance coverage were given to these employees,
the male would receive a greater fringe benefit than the female.
Because these differences in pay are determined solely by the gender of the employees, I conclude that this practice
violates the
44
Equal Pay Act and section 703(a)(1) of Title VII.

Furthermore, if an employer were forced by, say, a union contract into giving as fringe benefits equal amounts of annuity pension payments or life insurance awards to similarly situated male
and female employees, I conclude that the employer would violate
section 703(a)(2) of Title VII, which prohibits employers from classifying their employees in a way that might deprive them of employment opportunities because of their sex.45 If an employer is
forced to pay higher compensation to a woman employee in the
form of pension benefits or to a male employee in the form of life
insurance, these otherwise similarly situated employees will necessarily be less desirable to the employer. Because the magnitude of
benefits are wages, but disagree on how the value of the benefits should be measured.
43 I consider the evidence behind this assumption infra part IV. It should be emphasized that longer life expectancy, as it is considered at this point, is a characteristic shared
by every individual woman; actual longer life is a group trait because it appears when one
averages the lives of individual women.
" See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. Recently both the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") proposed revisions to regulations concerning equality of fringe benefits for
male and female employees under Executive Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), and the
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), for which they are respectively responsible. Proposed OFCCP Regulation, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,968, 42,985 (1981) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. §
60-1.21(c)(1)), provides that federal contractors "must not make any distinction based upon
sex in ... fringe benefits." Proposed EEOC Regulation, 46 Fed. Reg. 43,848, 43,851 (1981)
(to be codified at 41 C.F.R. § 1620.5(f)), provides: "It shall be unlawful for an employer to
have a pension or retirement plan which ... differentiates in benefits on the basis of sex."
Further, another section provides: "Under the expressed terms of the Act, when a prohibited sex-based wage differential has been proved, an employer can come into compliance
only by raising the wage rate of the lower paid sex." Id. at 43,852 (to be codified at 41 C.F.R.
§ 1620.15(a)).
45 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976). This section provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
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pension benefits is much greater than that of life insurance, the net
effect on women is likely to be greater than the effect on men. Although the extent of the impact is difficult to quantify, its precise
limits are not relevant, for the language of the statute makes it
sufficient that a practice "tend[s] to deprive" an employee of employment opportunities."
B.

Possible Per Se Illegality of Sex-Distinct Mortality Tables

Merton C. Bernstein and Lois G. Williams have concluded
that "the Equal Pay Act prohibits per se sex discrimination as to
wages" 4 7 and that "Title VII proscribes discrimination on the basis
of sex per se"' 48 unless the sex distinction relates to "a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. '49 Other commen51
tators, such as the Brilmayer group, 50 and the Court in Manhart
object to the use of sex-based mortality tables for calculating
fringe benefits on the incorrect view that such tables assign group
characteristics to individuals rather than weigh individual characteristics that are the same for all members of a given gender.52 It is
not clear, however, whether Brilmayer and her coauthors believe,
as do Bernstein and Williams, that any use of a sex-related factor
to determine compensation is per se illegal, even when its nonuse
results in invidious discrimination according to an employee's gender. Therefore, it is worthwhile to consider briefly the arguments
against considering sex-related measurements as per se illegal.
Mayer G. Freed and Daniel D. Polsby show that the courts
have not upheld a strict per se ban on classifications by sex, and
their own view is persuasive:
[A]lthough explicit sex classifications are presumptively invalid, they can be justified where there are strong efficiency interests at stake or where there is a broadly shared social norm
that requires that men and women be treated differently. The
46 Id. Some commentators, notably Bernstein & Williams, supra note 10, at 1212-13,
and supra note 13, at 1243-44, suggest this point. This issue is discussed further infra part
V-A.
47 Bernstein & Williams, supra note 10, at 1214.
4, Id. at 1215.

49

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1976).

50 Supra note 15, at 508-10.

51435 U.S. at 707-11.
2 Recall that at this point I assume that gender is associated with and efficiently
predicts the probability of death.
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foregoing statement eschews the illusory certainty of the per
se rule in favor of a candid recognition that the most that can
be hoped for is the identification of the factors relevant to the
resolution of sex discrimination claims and the implications of
53
these factors for decision making.
George Rutherglen also concludes that "[t]he existence of such
broad and uncertain areas in which sexual classifications are permissible suggests that the appropriate conception of sexual equality is not a version of the color-blind conception of racial
54
equality.2
But the most important argument for not applying a per se
rule is that its use would work contrary to the intent of the antidiscrimination statutes. As discussed in part II above, consideration
of the gender of annuitants and life insureds is necessary to measure both the value of these products to them and the cost to the
insurer. Thus, if this factor cannot be used legally, employees will
55
be unfairly treated solely because of their sex.
Freed & Polsby, supra note 13, at 589-90. They review the cases id. at 592-602.
Rutherglen, supra note 13, at 214-15; see also the cases cited therein, id. at 214 n.78.
5'Rutherglen's analysis leads him to a similar conclusion:
To the extent that an anticlassification interpretation of title VII prohibits sexual classifications necessary for equal treatment, it is inconsistent with the doctrine of disproportionate adverse impact; to the extent that a prohibition against sexual classifications
results in unequal treatment, it also results in a disproportionate adverse impact
Id. at 248. He later qualifies this conclusion, stating:
The conception of equality as equal treatment, therefore, must exclude from the determination of equal treatment sex-based classifications that, although economically relevant, are tainted by past discrimination. Specifically, sex-based classifications must be
excluded if they would perpetuate past discriminatory practices.
Id. at 250. But, he goes on:
Even assuming that the greater life expectancy of women is the result of past discriminatory practices, for instance, because women have been excluded from hazardous occupations, the use of sex-based actuarial tables does nothing to perpetuate such
practices ...
...If sex is a relevant characteristic and consideration of sex does not perpetuate
past discrimination, then fairness requires that it be taken into account. Failure to doso imposes present costs on those who are denied equal treatment without any prospect
of remedying past discrimination or avoiding future discrimination. The effect of Manhart is to deny men equal treatment in pension plans ....
Id. at 251 (footnote omitted).
After these and similar conclusions and a careful analysis, Rutherglen inexplicably asserts: "The distinctive defect of the equal-treatment conception of equality is the difficulty
of showing that sex is, or is not, nondiscriminatorily relevant to employment decisions." Id.
at 254. But in his prior discussion of Manhart, id. at 241-48, he severely and cogently criticizes arguments against the use of sex-distinct actuarial tables, saying:
[P]redictions of life expectancy must take sex into account to achieve the greatest pos"

sible accuracy. Scientific studies of life expectancy routinely classify individuals on the
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Finally, the arguments put forth by Brilmayer and her colleagues for treating an employee's sex as a forbidden criterion
should be considered. They claim:
Race, color, sex, religion, and national origin share three characteristics that justify the restrictions on their use. First, they
are ascriptive and immutable. Second, they have been widely
misused throughout history. Third, they are generally irrelevant to employment decisions. 6
As I hope the following brief analysis will show, treating these
characteristics as forbidden criteria would tend to increase the unfair treatment of individuals.
Because individuals have no control over their gender,
Brilmayer and her colleagues claim that there is "a special sense of
unfairness [in sex discrimination], for the victim can never escape
discrimination by her own efforts. ' 57 But if life expectancy is immutably associated with one's gender, at least over the period to
which the insurance contract applies, as they and I assume at this
point in the argument, to disregard life expectancy would be to
discriminate unfairly against or in favor of that person. In particular, it is bad enough that, all other things being equal, a man is not
likely to live as long as a woman. To ascribe to him a lesser
probability of his death than is warranted by the available data
and hence, to assign him lower promised annuity payments in exchange for a given present sum, is surely to treat him unfairly.
Similarly, to promise a woman a lesser amount in the event of her
death than is warranted by her individual life expectancy, based
on data that efficiently relate this probability to her gender, would
be unfair discrimination. Although the recipients probably would
not object to receiving more in annuity payments or death benefits,
basis of sex and routinely reveal sex-based differences. Nor does the scientific literature
contain any suggestion that sex can be supplanted in the near future by some more
accurate predictor of longevity.
Id. at 243 (citations omitted). This clear and forceful defense of the necessity and efficiency
of using sex-distinct actuarial tables is inconsistent with his final conclusion: "The anticlassification conception provides clear guidance to both judges and employers about what the
law prohibits and what it does not." Id. at 254. And in the last lines of the article, he says:
"The Supreme Court correctly [decided] ... in Manhart in favor of a rule against sexual
classifications. Despite the attractions of a rule of equal treatment, both in general and in
Manhart itself, the impracticality of the rule threatens to undermine the very equality it
seeks to attain." Id. at 256. It is difficult to understand how the same person could have
written both this conclusion and the analysis that preceded it.
"Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 526-27 (footnotes omitted).
57 Id. at 527.
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the extra resources must come from somewhere. Unless this allocation of resources to individuals because of their gender is legislatively ordered, it would seem to be contrary to the statutes that
mandate equality. Furthermore, the fact that a personal characteristic is immutable makes its use for insurance contracts particularly valuable, for it lessens the problem of moral hazard. Although
a person can change life-shortening habits, such as smoking, after
purchasing life insurance or an annuity, a person's gender is not
susceptible to such facile change. Therefore, the past relationship
between an immutable characteristic and mortality can be expected to continue after the contract is written.
The second cited characteristic, wide misuse of the specified
classifications throughout history, is clearly true. As a consequence,
use of any of them for distinguishing among employees is, and
should be, suspect. But as I have argued, the per se prohibition of
sex-distinct mortality tables for computing the value of employees'
insurance fringe benefits would exacerbate rather than alleviate
the misuse of classifications based on sex. 8
Brilmayer and her coauthors say that the third characteristic,
irrelevance, has two implications. One is that "[e]ven when sex is
strongly associated with a job qualification, at least some members
of both sexes are qualified."59 This observation, however, is irrelevant to insurance. The sex-related expected mortality of employees
is used not to deny them employment, but to calculate the value to
them of, and hence their compensation from, fringe benefits. Furthermore, if the "profit-maximizing" employer, as a consequence of
having to use a unisex table to calculate annuities, is required to
pay more to women simply because they are female, the result will
be fewer employment opportunities for women, which would
clearly victimize them.
The second implication of the irrelevance characteristic is "a
strong tendency to use forbidden criteria because they are convenient and cheap to administer."60 I agree that employers must not
carelessly accept actual or apparent past relationships between an
employee's gender and other factors as the bases for present decisions, lest stereotypes be continued and unfair discrimination be
practiced. But as shown in part II above, the cost of.administering
an insurance program is very relevant. Disregard of these costs,
See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
59 Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 527.
60 Id. at 528 (footnote omitted).
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particularly when they are reliably associated with such individual
characteristics as an insured's gender, necessarily must result in invidious treatment of someone. 1
C.

Race, Religion, and Mortality

Because of our strong aversion to racial and religious discrimination, many of those who conclude that use of sex-distinct mortality tables can be morally and legally necessary appear at pains
to distinguish this position from one that would permit the use of
an insured's race or religion. 2 Some, like Professor Kimball, argue
that race is not relevant to the issue of insurance because there is
no reliable empirical relationship between race and longevity, at
least with respect to annuitants." Professor Brilmayer and her col11In criticizing the five "forbidden criteria," Professor Brilmayer and her colleagues
make numerous assertions about the irrelevance of a person's sex to longevity: for example,
it "is a crude predictor even for a group," id. at 530, and "much of the association between
sex and mortality is spurious," id. at 531. These empirical evaluations are very important,
but they are relevant to the issue of per se prohibition only if they are empirically valid.
Evidence on this question that is inconsistent with their assertions is presented infra part
IV.
Professor Brilmayer and her coauthors also deal with the argument for necessity in the
same section of their article. Id. at 533-35. Most of this material repeats the previous assertions on the unreliability and potential misuse of sex as a predictor of longevity. Two other
questionable statements, however, should be evaluated. One is that sex should not be used
as a variable because a defense by a discriminator that an employee's productivity is associated with this trait "would be easy to assert and difficult to litigate." Id. at 534. Considering
the enormous amount of available data on longevity and the simple relationship under consideration (the risk of death), this argument does not seem relevant to the question at issue.
Additionally, their point is correct that "such defenses would violate the fundamental principles of the Act, by permitting employers to penalize, solely because of their sex, individuals for whom the prediction is inaccurate," id., but the reverse is equally correct. If a person's gender does efficiently measure longevity, required use of unisex tables would also
appear to violate the Act.
Second, they claim that the efficient use of an insured's gender as a predictor of longevity is, "[a]t most, . . . a special case of the argument that sex discrimination is sometimes
economically efficient." Id. at 534-35. This is not so. Invidious discrimination may be desired by those with a taste for it (bigots), but it is not economically efficient. Indeed, as I
discuss in part II above, not to use a personal attribute or other type of information efficiently is likely to result in invidious discrimination.
" Even Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination,supra note 14, only cautiously allows
that "race may sometimes be a legitimate classification. . . .One example of appropriate
use might be in a narrow health insurance policy covering only sickle cell anemia." Id. at
111 (footnote omitted).
s To analogize sex and race in discussing mortality is fallacious. Use of race is, for
estimation of mortality, wholly indefensible on factual grounds. Use of sex is not only
defensible but it reflects as well both common sense and available facts. Sex as a classifier is also relatively easy to use, while race is impossible to use meaningfully for mortality estimation in the real world.
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leagues, however, conclude that race and sex should be treated
similarly with respect to insurance benefits." I must say that I
agree with them.
If the goal is avoiding unfair discrimination against individuals
with respect to insurance, all traits associated with a person should
be used to estimate the risk that the insured-against event will occur to that person. For example, if sickle cell anemia increases the
risk of death, and if it is found only in blacks, and if there is no
efficient way to determine which particular black individuals have
or are likely to get this disease, but it can readily be determined
who is black, the additional risk should be accounted for. If this is
not done for annuities, blacks would not only have an immutably
greater risk of death, but they would not be compensated for this
risk. The same conclusion may hold for ailments related to 5religious or ethnic groups, such as Tay-Sachs disease in Jews.

Of

course, with respect to life insurance, if these traits are disregarded, the beneficiaries of the possibly affected people would gain.
If, as a matter of social policy, such a benefit is desired, it would
seem most equitable to transfer the resources directly out of the
general revenues rather than indirectly from other life insureds8e
The administrative costs of identifying, assessing, and monitoring
these risks, however, must be considered. As a result, in practice,
the risk of these diseases will usually be disregarded.
IV.

THE DATA ON GENDER AND MORTALITY

To this point, I have assumed that an individual's gender is an
efficient predictor of his or her life expectancy and thus must be
accounted for in calculating the value to an employee of insurancerelated fringe benefits if invidiously determined compensation is to
be avoided. It is tempting to follow Justice Stevens's lead and say
simply: "As a class, women live longer than men.

8

7

But if this

were a false statement, the use of sex-distinct mortality tables
could result in unfair discrimination according to an employee's
gender. And even though Professor Brilmayer and her colleagues
Id. at 113 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
" Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 536-39.
" See Rutherglen, supra note 13, at 205-12, especially 206 n.43, for references to scientific works on ethnic diseases.
08 As insurers and insureds adjust to these prohibitions, the costs and benefits will tend
to be borne and enjoyed by persons with those traits.
67 435 U.S. at 704.
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claim at the outset that "[o]ur own view of Title VII does not depend on the demographic evidence,"6' 8 they in fact repeatedly make
assertions about this evidence that are required for the validity of
the conclusions they draw. 9
The essential question that must be considered now is whether
the data on gender-related life expectancy qualify as efficient
estimators of the risk of death. An answer to that question should
deal with issues such as whether these data are likely to have been
contaminated by unfairly stereotyped beliefs about men and
women, whether alternative measures of life expectancy could be
used that would obviate the need to consider the insured's gender,
and whether the use of sex-distinct annuity tables is likely to perpetuate unfair stereotypes and to limit the opportunities for
women. Finally, because it is unlikely that these questions can be
answered in a completely satisfactory fashion, I present some reasons for believing that unqualified proofs are not necessary for the
issue at hand-sex discrimination in annuities.
A. Gender and Life Expectancy
A characteristic of an insured can usefully indicate the risk of
death and hence, the value of an annuity or life insurance policy to
an employee, if it efficiently predicts the probability of death.7 0 Because a prediction of a future event is required, data on past relationships are useful only if the relationships found are likely to
persist over the period in which the event could occur. For this
purpose, the data should relate to the person who is insured; that
is, it should be derived from the experiences of similar persons.
Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 507.

In particular, in discussing and apparently dismissing Kimball's correct and important point that the benefit to an employee is the present value of the expected annuity
'

payments, Reverse Sex Discrimination,supra note 14, at 99-102, Professor Brilmayer and

her colleagues state:
This expectancy argument begs the question in a fundamental way. The ultimate issue
is precisely whether mortality data may be classified by sex for the purpose of paying
annuities-that is, whether sex may be used to predict longevity. No expectancy can be
calculated until that question has been answered.
Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 512. In dismissing the argument that sex-distinct tables
be allowed as an exception to the ban on disparate treatment, they assert: "Finally, sex is
irrelevant to longevity in the Title VII sense: it does not predict longevity in individual
cases, and is a crude predictor even for groups." Id. at 530. These assertions are not, in fact,
supported by any data presented that are relevant for the present issue, as I show infra part
IV-B.
7' See supra part H1-B. As defined there, "efficient" refers to the use of information so
that the marginal benefits derived from its use are at least equal to its marginal cost.
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The postulated relationship also should have provided useful predictions of life expectancy: the actual and the predicted times of
death should be close, compared with alternative predictors. This
last point is important, because the most one can do in assessing
risk is to compare one set of predictors with alternatives, such as
using other variables, throwing dice, consulting oracles, or using a
table of random digits. It is preferable that the postulated relationship be grounded in a theory that efficiently predicts the effect of
changed circumstances on life expectancy. But this is not necessary
if past relationships have been stable and previous predictions
accurate.
The use of an insured's gender as a predictor of his or her life
expectancy meets all of these criteria well, as the following data
indicate. The question at issue concerns annuities for employees of
United States companies; therefore, the data presented generally
relate to persons who can be members of this set.
1.

The Accuracy of Predictions of Mortality Based on Gen-

der. Table 1 shows the ratios of actual to expected deaths by age
group of annuitants with individual policies at United States insurance companies over the period 1960 through 1967. Three sex-distinct life expectancy tables that were created with data from different time periods were used to project the expected incidence of
death from 1960 through 1967. The projections made with the a1949 Ultimate Tables were almost all more than the actuals, producing ratios that are almost all less than 1.0; decreases in mortality apparently were not sufficiently accounted for. These sex-distinct tables, however, yielded almost the same degree of error
overall for females and for males. The 1963 Experience Tables
were almost perfectly on the mark for both males and females. The
1971 IAM Tables provided for an underestimate of mortality to
adjust for the belief that life expectancies would lengthen; past experience was adjusted to this expectation. Note, though, that the
adjustment is virtually the same for males and females. Thus these
data show that the expectation models that use sex- and age-classified data are not biased by sex, because they predict well. Considering that, at the annuity-relevant ages (over sixty), the male mortality rate is about twice that of the rate for females, 7 1 it is clear
that a merged gender (unisex) table would not predict mortality
nearly as well.
71 See infra p. 516, Table 2.

Gender Discrimination

1982]

TABLE 1
RATIOS OF ACTUAL TO EXPECTED DEATHS BASED ON VARIOUS ANNUITY TABLES;
EXPERIENCE OF INSURANCE COMPANIES ON INDIVIDUAL ANNUITIES, 1960-1967

a-1949

1963 Experience

1971 IAM

Ultimate Tables

Tables

Tables

Age Group

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

60-64

1.01

1.11

1.04

1.05

1.31

1.33

65-69

.95

.87

1.01

.99

1.27

1.25

70-74

.95

.86

1.01

1.00

1.27

1.27

75-79

.94

.92

1.00

1.00

1.26

1.27

80-84

.95

.97

1.01

1.00

1.25

1.24

85-89

.91

.98

1.00

.99

1.19

1.17

90-94

.95

.98

1.00

1.01

1.14

1.16

95-99

.98

.78

.97

.97

1.08

1.08

60-99

.94

.93

1.01

1.00

1.25

1.23

SOURCE:

Derived from Cherry, The 1971 Individual Annuity Mortality Table, 23 TRANSAC-

TIONS (Soc'y of Actuaries) 475 (1971) (numbers rounded off) (footnotes omitted).

2. Differences in Mortality by Gender Over Time. Further
evidence on the usefulness of considering gender and age, and sup-

port for the conclusion that sex-distinct annuity tables are useful
and, indeed, necessary, are provided by Table 2. This table gives
the ratio of actual male mortality rates to female mortality rates
from 1900 through 1975 at ages sixty, sixty-five, seventy, and seventy-five for the United States white population. As it shows, male
mortality rates at all relevant ages and time periods are greater
than the female rates. The magnitudes are such that, if they are
not accounted for and if the relative numbers of females in the
group are other than trivial, predicted mortality is likely to differ
considerably from actual. 2
7' The fact that the distributions of mortality rates for males and females of a given age
overlap to the extent of about 84% has been used by some "experts" and advocates to
"demonstrate" that "the argument that females live longer than males is a generality that
applies to a minority and not the majority." Martin, Gender Discriminationin Pension
Plans, 43 J. RISK & INS. 203, 209 (1976). The "overlap" also gave rise to arguments such as
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TABLE 2
RATIO OF MALE TO FEMALE MORTALITY RATES AT RETIREMENT AGES
U.S. WHITE POPULATION, 1900-1975

At Age
Period

60

65

70

75

1900-02

1.14

1.15

1.10

1.10

1909-11

1.19

1.16

1.10

1.12

1919-21

1.13

1.10

1.09

1.08

1929-31

1.28

1.24

1.19

1.14

1939-41

1.49

1.39

1.29

1.21

1949-51

1.78

1.67

1.48

1.33

1959-61

2.08

1.95

1.71

1.49

1969-71

2.19

2.17

1.96

1.70

1972

2.19

2.15

1.98

1.73

1973

2.14

2.19

2.03

1.73

1974

2.09

2.17

2.02

1.74

1975

2.07

2.18

2.04

1.78

SOURCE: Derived from Survival After Midlife, 58 STATISTICAL BULL. 2 (Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., July-Aug. 1977).
Note: Data on the total population are not given in this publication although they are
almost the same, because 87.4% of the total United States population is white. See U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION & HOUSING 5 (Summary Vol. 1, Oct.
1971). The nonwhite mortality rates also are similar. See Survival After Midlife Among
Nonwhites, 58 STATISTcAL BULL. 10, 11 (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Oct. 1977).

the following
[The use of sex-distinct annuity tables] allows employers to arrange things so that
the savings in annuity costs for the 8 percent of the population consisting of excess
men who die early are entirely monopolized by men, although 84 percent of all men are
in the overlap group.
The extra burdens imposed by the higher annuity costs of 8 percent of the population consisting of excess women who die late are entirely allocated by employers to
women, 84 percent of whom are in the overlap group.
Bergmann & Gray, Equality in Retirement Benefits: The Need for Pension Reform, 8 Civ.
Rs. DIG. 25, 25 (1975).
The fallaciousness of the conclusions drawn from the overlap phenomenon has been
explained cogently by several writers, including comments on Martin's article by Hedges,
Gender Discriminationin Pension Plans: Comment, 44 J. ISK & INS. 141, 143 (1977), and
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Table 2 also shows that the ratio of male to female mortality
rates has been generally increasing since 1900, though it has been
fairly stable since the 1950's. For the purpose of assessing the risk
of an annuity promise, these data are reasonably stable, for predictions must be made only over a twenty- or twenty-five-year period,
the time from an employee's retirement until his or her death.
3. The Influence of Factors Other than the Insured's Gender and Age. It is well known that gender and age are not the only
personal characteristics that predict death. As Justice Stevens
noted, "a significant part of the longevity differential may be explained by the social fact that men are heavier smokers than
women,"7 8 and "[o]ther social causes, such as drinking or eating
habits-perhaps even the lingering effects of past employment discrimination-may also affect the mortality differential."74 It would
be in the self-interest of insurers to use these and other facts for
assessing the risk posed by an insured. Why, then, do they not do
so?
The first answer is that they do, where the cost of obtaining
and using the information does not exceed the benefits from improved assessments of risk. As Barbara J. Lautzenheiser points
out:
In life insurance, the risk being borne by the insurer is the
risk of early death. The insurer, then, must guard against the
Myers, FurtherComment, id. at 144, 145; see also Johansen, The Inequity of Equality, THE
AcTuARY, June 1977, at 5; Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination,supra note 14, at 120-23;
King, Men, Women, and Life Annuities, 27 C. & UNIV. PERSONNEL Assoc. J. 65, 67-72
(1976). These writers point out that an overlap of two distributions is irrelevant for assessing probabilities, unless it can be shown that at some accepted level of error, the two distributions are not significantly different; hence, although they may differ, it is not efficient to
distinguish them. This is certainly not the case in most instances for distributions with overlaps of only 84%. Indeed, as Johansen calculates, if each person of a group of 1000 males
and 1000 females of age 65 were given a dollar for each year he or she continued to live,
"then the total annuity payments to the cohort of 1,000 females over their lifetimes would
exceed the payments to the 1,000 males by 23.5 percent. In no way can it be asserted that
this excess number of payments is financially inconsequential." Johansen, supra, at 5. The
critics of the "overlap" demonstration also point out that almost exactly the same overlap is
found for ages five years apart (which is one reason that actuaries simply "set back" the
male mortality table by five years to use as an approximate female table). See Kimball,
Reverse Sex Discrimination,supra note 14, at 122-23. It is particularly upsetting to me, as
an economist, that Martin, Bergmann, and Gray, who are professors of finance and economics and who should know better, put forth this argument. It also is unfortunate that the
Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 531, repeats it; although they also cite Kimball, id. at
n.121, they do not mention his valid critique.
7 435 U.S. at 709-10.
7' Id. at 710 n.17.
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insured's having knowledge.. . that he has not been feeling
well, that he has a certain disease, that his family history indicates a certain disease, that he sky dives on Sundays, i.e.
knowledge that will put him in a special "extra cost" class. So
these characteristics, along with age and sex, are information
the insurer needs to know to classify the risk properly. In life
insurance, then, selection is done by the insurer."'
Consequently, "today most large insurers recognize "and underwrite
as many as fifteen to twenty-five substandard [that is, "extra
cost"] classes, at premium rates in excess of standard rates but
based on the anticipated cost of providing the coverage. '
With respect to annuities, though, Lautzenheiser asks: "Why,
then are not these questions of health, occupation, avocation, etc.
as well as questions of age and sex asked when an annuity is issued?

77

She answers by asking rhetorically:

If a person knows he or she has a higher probability of
dying because of any of the elements-health, occupation,
family history, avocation-would he or she not be unwise to
buy an annuity which pays only for long life, not short life? In
the case of an annuity, then, self-selection is done by the insured (annuitant) in advance for all the elements except age
and sex. Hence those are the only questions that need to be
asked by the insurer.
In either case all elements are important; it's just that the
insurer relies on the insured to do some of his selection in the
case of annuities.78
Because of this self-selection for individually purchased annuities
and because employment annuities are paid only to people who are
well enough to retire, insurers assume that annuitants are likely to
live longer than people in general, and the mortality tables take
75 Lautzenheiser, Sex and the Single Table: Equal Monthly Retirement Income for the

Sexes?, 2 EMPLOYEE BENEFrrS J. 8,38 (1976). Lautzenheiser is Vice President and Actuary of
Bankers Life Nebraska.
7' Bailey group, supra note 10, at 791. The authors describe six of the specialized classifications and point out that, in the early history of risk classification, after it was recognized
that without such classifications the insurance schemes failed, "[h]ealth history and general
physical condition, sex, occupation, morals, use of alcohol or tobacco, and other matters
pertaining to the life style of the applicant were considered in the underwriting of each
risk." Id. at 785.
77 Lautzenheiser, supra note 75, at 38.
78

Td_
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this expectation into account."9

Other reasons why such important mortality-related factors as
smoking, heredity, personality, and places of birth are not considered in estimating the cost for annuitants is that they are either
susceptible of misrepresentation by the annuitant, have not been
recorded sufficiently for reliable statistics to have been developed,
or do not predict well the annuitant's condition at the time the
annuity is expected to be paid. For example, annuitants have incentives to claim that they previously smoked heavily; but even if
this claim could be verified, how could the confessed smokers be
prevented from shaking the habit later? Heredity also is known to
be an important determinant of longevity, but how can an insurer
verify an annuitant's claim that his or her parents' relatively early
deaths were due to causes that are presently or prospectively relevant? This difficulty of verification is even more pronounced for
personality. Gender, though, does not present this problem.
4. Theoretical Relationships, Spurious Correlations, and
Changing Environmental Conditions. It is a commonplace and
correct observation that biological and environmental factors
rarely, if ever, can be completely distinguished in studies of human
behavior, morbidity, and mortality. Nevertheless, there is reason to
believe that a significant portion of the clearly lower mortality
7' See 1 J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, supra note 27, at 296-99 ("death rates at the various
ages are generally lower for annuitants than for insured lives and... different mortality
tables are used for computing annuity rates and payments than are used for life insurance
purposes"). Note also that the data presented in Table 1 are for all types of policies combined. Actuaries know, however, that people tend to select the types of policies that reflect
their estimates of their own life expectancies. For example, in reviewing the data, Cherry,
The 1971 Individual Annuity Mortality Table, 23 TRNSACTIONS (Soc'y of Actuaries) 475,
531 (1971), reports:
As expected, nonrefund immediate annuities exhibit the lowest mortality ratios, 87.6
percent overall for males and 90.0 percent for females. Nonrefund settlement annuities
also have lower-than-average mortality ratios [actual to expected], although not as low
as under immediate annuities (92.4 percent for males and 98.2 percent for females).
Under immediate annuities with a refund period, mortality ratios for males are practically the same under settlement annuities with a refund period, about 102 percent in
both cases. For female refund annuities, the mortality ratios are 98.8 percent and 103.2
percent for immediate annuities and settlement annuities, respectively.
A refund annuity provides that "if the total of the payments actually made to the annuitant
at the time of his death does not equal or exceed the purchase price he paid for the contract,
the difference will be paid to a successor-payee, if living, otherwise to the annuitant's estate." 1 J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, supra note 27, at 291. An immediate annuity is purchased by the annuitant for himself while a settlement annuity is paid to a beneficiary designated by the insured. Id. at 292, 294. People who have lower expectations of long life are
likely to opt for refund annuities, but there is no particular self-selection bias for the immediate versus the settlement annuities.
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rates of females is inherent. One genetic explanation is that the
female has two X chromosomes while the male has an X and a Y,
which is postulated to give the female a better chance to obviate
the consequences of a recessive wayward gene in an X chromosome.80 Innate differences in the physical make-up of females and
males also appear to play an important role in longevity. As
Amram Scheinfeld concludes: "under like conditions, females are
better adapted to cope with most human afflictions because they
are genetically better constructed and have a more efficient chemical system."8 1 Twelve studies that directly addressed this hypothesis were reviewed by Ingrid Waldron, who somewhat cautiously
summarized them as follows: "Genetic factors apparently also contribute to higher male mortality, although the evidence for this is
not as strong as commonly has been believed. ' 82 Those studies,
however, were related to mortality at all ages, while the present
issue concerns only people of retirement age. Therefore, it should
be of interest to review a study that directly considered the cause
of the mortality differential among males and females of retirement age.
Francis C. Madigan carefully gathered and examined the mortality records from 1900 through 1954 of 9813 Roman Catholic religious Brothers and 32,041 Sisters who were teachers and administrative personnel engaged in educational work. 3 To obtain a
homogeneous group of subjects, he excluded "those who have
served in foreign missions, those who had been married before entrance into the religious life, the foreign-born, the non-white, and
those who had entered into the religious community on or after
their twenty-seventh birthday. ' ' " Thus, he points out:
Five highly significant sources of differential stress between
the sexes had been eliminated: (1) male service in the armed
forces; (2) greater male liberty to dissipate; (3) the dissimilar
roles of husband and wife; (4) male employment in hazardous
and life-shortening occupations; and (5) the employment of
80See A. SCHEiNFELD, YouR HEREDrrY AND ENVMONmENT 217-21 (1965).
81 Id. at 218-19 (emphasis in original).
82 Waldron, Why Do Women Live Longer Than Men?, 10 Soc. Sci. & MED. 349, 349

(1976).
' Madigan, Are Sex Mortality Differentials Biologically Caused?, 35 MMBANK MEMORLAL FUND Q. 202, 206 (1957). The records examined included 98% of the universe of religious Brothers and 50% of the universe of Sisters in 1927, the midpoint of the study.
Id. at 204.
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men and women in diverse occupations.

5

The only possible important nonbiological factors not controlled
for were that "the Brothers are more likely to smoke and take an
occasional drink," and "the life of the young [up to age forty] Sisters seems to be slightly more stressful. 8' 8 Madigan's findings for
ages sixty-five and over are summarized below in Table 3, where
the ratios of male to female mortality rates, by decade from 1910
through 1949 and 1950 to 1954, and by age group, are given for the
Roman Catholic Brothers and Sisters and for the United States
white population. In all periods and ages, the ratios in Table 3
show that males experienced higher death rates than females, and
in nine of the twelve usable subsets and over the period as a whole,
the difference between the sexes for the Roman Catholic sample
was greater than for the United States white population. 87 Madigan thus concluded that biological factors were the chief cause of
the superior longevity of the Sisters. 8
Professor Brilmayer and her coauthors hastily dismiss these
findings, arguing that "[b]ecause differences in smoking behavior
account for a large portion of the SMD [sex mortality difference]
in the general population, Professor Madigan's study is of no probative value." 8 9 This is much too strong a condemnation, for it is
based solely on Madigan's statement that "the Brothers are more
likely to smoke."9 0 The male-female differentials he reported cover
5 Id. at 205.
"

Id. at 204.

a The findings for ages below 65 are similar. The major difference is that mortality
rates for Roman Catholic Sisters are greater than those for Roman Catholic Brothers at ages
15 through 44 for the periods before 1939 (with two exceptions). Madigan explains that
these exceptionally high death rates among the Sisters were due to tuberculosis. Id. at 21718.
u Id. at 217.
" Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 550. Waldron, supra note 82, at 350, is more
careful, stating that "the higher mortality of the Brothers cannot be attributed solely to
genetic causes" (emphasis added).
90 Madigan, supra note 83, at 204 (emphasis added). In the lengthy dissertation from
which his article was drawn, Madigan does not mention any differences in smoking habits
between Brothers and Sisters. F. Madigan, The Differential Mortality of the Sexes, 19001954: Cultural and Biological Factors in the Diverging Life Chances of American Men and
Women (1956) (available in the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Library). He
describes at length the regimented and similar quality of their daily lives, which included
"easy access to good medical and dental care;... a calm and peaceful regime of daily life,
which fixes the amount of time to be given to sleep, to recreation, and to work and prayer;
the practice of a life of moderation in eating, drinking, exercise, and generally in all other
things; the prudent counsel and direction of a wise and experienced religious superior; and
the role behavior expected of the members of the two groups." Id. at 64. Because the Broth-
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TABLE 3
RATIO OF MALE TO FEMALE MORTALITY RATES AT R
ROMAN CATHOLIC

(R.C.)

I

RMENT AGES

TEACHING AND ADMINISTRATIVE BROTHERS AND SISTERS

COMPARED TO U.S. WHITE POPULATION,

Age 65-74

1910-1954

Age 75-84

85 and over

Perioda

R.C.

U.S.

R.C.

U.S.

R.C.

U.S.

1910-19

1.10

1.14

2 .3 6 b

1.09

c

1.04

1920-29

1.52

1.17

1:75

1.10

C

1.04

1930-39

1.30

1.28

1.45

1.15

c

1.10

1940-49

1.26

1.44

1.19

1.22

1 .1 8 b

1.15

1950-54

1.92

1 .5 3 d

1.42

1 .2 5 d

1 .2 8 b

1 . 10 d

1900-54

1.41

1.34 d

1.40

1 .2 0 d

1.56

1 . 13 d

SOURCE: Madigan, Are Sex Mortality Differentials Biologically Caused?, 35 MnBAK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 202, 216 (1957).
a United States data are through the end of the decade (e.g., 1910-1920).
b Based on fewer than 50 persons.
C Not available (1900-09 not shown for this reason).
d United States data here are through 1953.

historical periods before deaths from smoking were likely to be important 91 and over which the higher male death rates nevertheless
were found. Furthermore, Robert D. Retherford, who is cited by
the Brilmayer group 92 and Justice Stevens,93 presents data suggesting that even if the Brothers smoked as heavily as the male
population in general, the life expectancies of males and females
reflected in Table 3 would not be changed much.9 ' In short, Madiers and Sisters were predominantly teachers of children, it is unlikely that they would have
been permitted to smoke, except perhaps in the time permitted for private recreation. According to the typical daily schedule given by Madigan, id. at 69, this time is unlikely to
have exceeded an hour a day.
11 See Table 3 above; infra note 94.
92 Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 533 n.130.
11 435 U.S. at 710 n.17.
R. RTHmEFoRD, THE CHANGING SEx DIFFERENTIAL IN MORTALITY 74-79 (1975). The

only data on smoking and mortality are from an American Cancer Society study carried out
from 1959 to 1964. Retherford gives the following life expectancies at age 37, id. at 75 (table
14)-the only relevant data he presents. For comparison, the most similar data given by
Madigan, supra note 83, at 213 (table 1), follow as well.
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gan's conclusion that biology is the chief ingredient in female longevity has not been seriously challenged.
Of course, environmental factors also play a large role in determining the higher United States male mortality rates. Waldron
reviewed 163 scientific papers and concluded that:
Sex differences in behavior are a more important cause for
higher male mortality than are any inherent sex differences in
physiology. Furthermore, although sex differences in behavior
may be due in part to genetic differences, cross-cultural and
developmental studies clearly show that child-rearing practices and cultural factors strongly influence behavioral differences in both children and adults. 5
Although it may be desirable to effect the societal changes that
would bring about a decrease in male mortality, Waldron admits
that the required behavioral modifications "will be difficult to
achieve. ' ' " Indeed, if much of this behavior is itself genetic (as the
sociobiologists claim'7 ), it is unlikely to change quickly, if at all. In
any event, it seems clear that the generally acknowledged difference between male and female mortality rates, particularly at ages
above sixty, is significantly, though not entirely, due to biological
and other relatively unchanging factors. Brilmayer and her colleagues are wrong in stating that "[s]ex is also irrelevant in a reFemales

Males

(F/M)

cigarette smokers

41.33

35.44

1.17

nonsmokers

42.64

39.93

1.07

total sample

42.37

37.24

1.14

U.S. white

40.80

35.90

1.14

Sisters and Brothers

43.25

37.61

1.15

Retherford (at age 37, 1959-64)

Madigan (at age 35, 1950-54)

If the Sisters are considered to be like Retherford's nonsmoking females, and the Brothers
like Retherford's total male sample, the F/M ratio would be 42.64/37.24, or 1.15. Also,
Retherford shows that relatively heavy cigarette smoking (which he believes is mainly responsible for greater mortality) did not begin until the 1930's: consumption per capita went
from 611 in 1920 to 1365 in 1930, and then increased again to 3322 in 1950. Retherford,
supra, at 72. Smoking by Brothers in these years is unlikely to have affected the death rates
of most of Madigan's sample, because it covers the period 1900-54.
95 Waldron, supra note 82, at 358 (footnote omitted).
" Id.
97

See generally E. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY (1975).
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lated sense: much of the association between sex and mortality is
spurious."9 8
For the present issue of estimating the value of retirement annuities to employees, whether environmental or biological factors
are responsible for the acknowledged difference in mortality by
gender is relevant only if those factors affect the accuracy of mortality predictions. As the data presented above and the voluminous
actuarial science literature show, knowledge of an annuitant's gender permits a much more accurate assessment of the risk of that
person's death than is provided by models that omit this variable.
Though the measured past relationships may change (for example,
as more women smoke), the data presently available indicate that
the disparity between male and female mortality rates has widened
during this century and is too large to be ignored.99 Furthermore,
the available evidence indicates that the increasing participation of
women in the labor force is unlikely to affect greatly their life expectancy. In particular, even Professor Brilmayer and her coauthors note that "[o]ne study by TIAA-CREF reports that there is
no difference in the mortality experience of its primary female annuitants (covered working women) and its secondary female annuitants (the wives of working men)." 10 0 Their following objection
that "this insurance pool consists of upper-level white-collar workers whose overall mortality is likely to be low because of their socioeconomic status, which is shared by their immediate families," 101 actually reinforces the point. The only important
difference between the two groups of women with the same mortality experience is that the primary annuitants worked at colleges
and universities while the secondary annuitants did not; thus there
is no socioeconomic differential between the two groups. Professor
Brilmayer and her colleagues also cite "[a] study of Railroad Retirement Board beneficiaries [that] shows [in fact] 'slightly longer
life expectancies at all ages 60 and over for female retired employees than for wives and widows of male retired employees.' "102 Although it may be true, as Brilmayer and her colleagues say, that
"

Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 531.
" In setting annuity payments, insurers tend to use tables that reflect the most recently available data that pertain to the people insured. Hence, as relationships change, so
do the calculated risks and the periodic payments promised at the time the payments begin.
100 Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 557 n.276 (citing R. DUNCAN, TIAA FEMALE MIoRTALITY EXPERIENCE 1965-70 (1972) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review)).

101 Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 557 n.276.
102 Id. (quoting R. DUNCAN, supra note 100, at 1).
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"[i]n this pool, women workers may have been disproportionately
white collar, so that they did not necessarily share the socioeconomic status of male coworkers and their wives,"1 03 this concern
does not invalidate the findings that the greater longevity of
women does not appear to be adversely affected because they work
outside the home.
Finally, one might ask whether it is equitable to treat a specific person as simply a woman or man of a given age. The answer
can be found by considering the alternative-what if a person's
gender is not considered? In that event, the risk of any man's
death will be estimated as being equal to the risk of the death of
any woman of the same age. Hence, given our present state of
knowledge, ignoring a person's gender necessarily results in an incorrect assessment of the risk and unfair discrimination against
that person.
B. An Evaluation
Evidence

of the

Brilmayer

Group's

Demographic

Professor Brilmayer and her coauthors devote over a third of
their article to showing that "sex turns out to be a spurious, weak,
and unstable predictor of mortality,"1 04 and their "findings" already have been given popular currency.1 05 In fact, as the following
analysis shows, this important part of their paper is comprised primarily of nonsequiturs or incorrect statements.
1. Nonsequiturs.Most of the Brilmayer group's presentation
is devoted to demonstrating the inaccuracy of Professor Kimball's
sweeping and unnecessary generalization that "[w]omen have better mortality experience than do men, at all ages from conception
on, at all times during this century, in almost all countries."108 Ac103
10

Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 557 n.276.
Id. at 559.

For example:
A recent study carried out by four University of Chicago researchers, and reported in

The University of Chicago Law Review, charges that mortality tables based on sex fail
to predict life expectancy accurately and are no more reliable than separate tables
based on race or other factors that have been discarded over the years.
Fenske, Unisex Mortality Tables: The Battle Lines are Drawn, 81 BEss's REv. 12, 98 (Life/

Health Ins. ed. April 1981). Of course, Brilmayer and her colleagues are not responsible for
inaccurate descriptions of their work: in particular, they did not examine the predictive
ability of sex-distinct as compared to unisex tables or of tables based on "factors that have
been discarded over the years." Id.
2" Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination,supra note 14, at 113 (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted).
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tually, for the issue of employee retirement annuities, only relatively recent data for United States workers of retirement age are
relevant, and so Kimball's assertion sets up a straw man. In particular, the data the Brilmayer group presents1 0 7 to attack this argument about a universal, biological female advantage are relevant
only insofar as the material shows that the greater life expectancy
of female annuitants is not entirely due to inherent biological factors. Any implication that such data show the unreliability of
SMDs for United States retirees is simply a nonsequitur.
2. Misstatements. Professor Brilmayer and her colleagues argue that SMDs are too unstable to use for predictive purposes, relying on evidence that "[i]n the United States, within the adult life
of a single annuitant, the SMD measured by the expectation of life
at birth increased from 1.0 year in 1920 to 7.7 years in 1970; the
SMD at age 65 increased proportionately."1 0 8 But the relevant time
period for measuring the sex mortality difference between male
and female annuitants is the period between retirement and death.
Within this period of from 15 to 25 years, the SMD has not varied
as greatly. The expected life remaining at age 65 was estimated in
1975 to be 18.1 years for females and 13.7 years for males. 10 9 In
1959-61, life expectancies at age 65 were estimated to be 15.9 years
for females and 13.0 years for males, and in 1949-51, the corresponding estimates were 15.0 and 12.8 years. 110 Thus, the retirement age SMDs have changed only 2.2 years over the past 25
years."1 1 The evidence relied on by Brilmayer and her colleagues
misstates the historical change in relevant SMDs.
A more important error is one of omission. Professor
Brilmayer and her colleagues purport to discuss "The Instability of
SMDs,"11 2 but relevant data are not'presented that speak to the
essential question of whether sex-distinct tables yield more accurate predictions of life expectancy than unisex tables.
Some indication of the relative stability of the SMDs can be
drawn from Table 4, which I prepared from readily available data.
The table gives changes in life expectancies at age sixty-five for the
Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 542-46.
'01 Id. at 552 (footnotes omitted).
109 Survival After Midlife, 58 STATISTICAL BULL. 2 (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., July107

Aug. 1977) (representing life expectancies of American white population).
110 Id.
111 (18.1 - 13.7) - (15.0 - 12.8) = 2.2. For further evidence on the stability of SMDs, see
infra p. 527, Table 4.
112 Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 551.
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total white population, which, if females and males were equally
weighted, would be the unisex life expectancy, and for females,
males, and the SMD. The changes between decades from 1900
through 1971 and the cumulative changes presented show that the
changes in SMDs were both small in absolute amount and, after
1921, always increasing by about the same amount per decade,
which is more important, for the problem is to predict changes. In
comparison, the changes in the total, the male, and the female life
expectancies are either somewhat greater or more variable. If
Brilmayer and her colleagues consider the amount of SMD instability too great, then they should be as opposed to actuaries making any changes in life expectancies as they are to actuaries recognizing the different life expectancies of women and men.
TABLE 4
CHANGES IN LIFE EXPECTANCIES IN YEARS AT AGE 65, U.S. WHITE POPULATION,
a
BY DECADE, 1900-71: TOTAL, FEMALE, MALE, AND SMD

Decade Change
Period

Cumulative Change

Total Female Male SMD

1900-02 - 1909-11 -0.2
1909-11 - 1919-21

-0.2

-0.2

Total Female Male

SMD

0.6

0.5

0.7

-0.2

0.5

0.45

0.6

0.3

0.3

0.0

0.8

0.7

1919-21 - 1929-31 -0.15

0.1

1929-31 - 1939-41

0.55

0.8

0.3

0.5

1.0

1.4

0.6

0.8

1939-41 - 1949-51

1.05

1.4

0.7

0.7

2.05

2.8

1.3

1.5

1949-51 - 1959-61
1959-61 - 1969-71

0.55
0.5

0.9
1.0

0.2
0.0

0.7
1.0

2.6
3.1

3.7
4.7

1.5
1.5

2.2
3.2

0.9

-0.2

-0.4

Derived from Survival After Midlife, 58
Ins. Co., July-Aug. 1977).
Sex Mortality Difference = Female minus Male.
SOURCE:

STATISTICAL BULL. 2

(Metropolitan Life

The Brilmayer group's suggestion is that "it is possible that
the women on whom the annuity tables are based were an elite
group whose greater longevity has temporarily exaggerated the
SMD in industry tables."1 1 The authors speculate that as more
women become employed, and as female annuitants from less elite
"I Id. at

557 (footnote omitted).
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classes mature, the SMD will shrink. The authors cite as authority
here, however, the Duncan and Railroad Retirement Board studies, 114 which in fact report almost no difference between women

who work in and out of the home. 115
Discussing the "Implications of the Demographic Analysis," 6
Brilmayer and her colleagues repeat the misstatement discussed
above: "Whatever the causes of differential male and female life
expectancy, the fact that is most damaging to proponents of segregated tables is that SMDs change rapidly. 1 1 7 The data presented

in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 refute this conclusion, and the Brilmayer
group has not presented relevant data that indicate otherwise. The
authors conclude further that "the magnitude of potential errors is
enormous in proportion to the difference being predicted."118 They
present no data relevant to retirement-age SMDs, however, and
the almost exact equivalence of actual and predicted deaths
presented in Table 1 is evidence against their assertion. 119 Furthermore, they fail to consider why insurers who persist in using sexdistinct mortality tables that yield enormous errors have not gone
broke.
Finally, in the earlier parts of their article, Professor
Brilmayer and her colleagues make assertions on which they rest
important aspects of their argument. The authors claim that
20
"knowing a person's sex tells very little about when he will die";
that "there is no reason to expect sex differences among current
insureds to match those reflected in the tables"; 12 ' that "[t]he use

of sex as a predictor of longevity would be improper even if it were
114

Id. n.276. The footnote includes the following observation, the relevance of which

eludes me: "Data on individual life insurance holders show little difference in SMD between
policy holders and the general population."
15 See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
116 Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 558.
117 Id.
n8 Id. at 559 (footnote omitted).
'" Laycock & Sullivan, supra note 15, at 227, in their response to Kimball, repeat
"But sex mortality differences have not been stable even for three decades in this century in
the United States" (footnote omitted). Their citation is to 2 U.S. DP'T OF HEW, PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED

§ 5 Life Tables, at 5-15 (1977). This table shows the following difference in "Average
Length of Life in Years" between males and females (total) from the last year given, 1976,
by decades: 1976 - 7.7; 1966 - 7.1; 1956 - 6.2; 1946 - 5.0; and 1936 - 4.0. (The earliest year
given is 1929). The year-to-year change, however, is gradual and slight. See supra p. 527,
Table 4. Although these numbers change, they hardly should be described as "unstable."
120 Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 531.
1I Id. (footnote omitted).
STATES
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the only available predictor: sex would still be immutable, subject
to abuse, and a weak predictor";1 22 and that "[r]egardless of its

causes, the association between sex and mortality is weak and unstable." 12' Not only do the data they later present not support
these assertions but, as the material presented above shows, the
assertions are incorrect.
C. The Market Solution to the Choice of Relevant Predictors of
Longevity
One additional concern should be addressed. Considering the
long and shameful history of discrimination against women, how
can we be assured that insurers do not consider an insured's gender to the exclusion of other, more relevant factors because of conscious or unwitting bias against females? And is there reason to
fear that continued use of sex-distinct mortality tables will reinforce sexual stereotypes? I believe that the workings of a competitive market for insurance provide satisfactory answers to these
questions. These are discussed with respect to the historical evidence of insurers' incentives to use sex-distinct tables, the effect on
insurers of not using all relevant factors, and the self-interest of
employers and employees.
1. The Incentive of Insurers to Use Sex-Distinct Tables-The HistoricalEvidence. There is no reason to expect insurers consciously to use any variables other than those that provide
efficient estimates of risk. Although some people, including those
'
working for or as insurers, may have "a taste for discrimination,"12
this preference for discriminating against women rarely is satisfied
by refusing to take their money, particularly when the biased person need not be in contact with the object of his or her dislike. The
only counterargument that I can think of requires effective collusion by all or most insurers to charge women more for insurance.
Considering the widespread existence of state laws and regulations
that prohibit "unfair discrimination between persons of the same
class," 125 such collusion would be extremely difficult, even if all the
" Id. at 534.
123 Id. at 539.
124 For an excellent economic analysis of peoples' preferences to avoid association with
members of particular groups, see G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCIUMINATION 13-17 (2d
ed. 1971).
,,5See Bailey group, supra note 10, at 793. State legislative and regulatory actions are
outlined id. at 793-804.
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insurers could agree and could police their agreement. Furthermore, the feared collusion is inconsistent with the actual practice
of charging females less than similarly situated males for life insurance, which accounts for a12much
larger portion of the insurance
6
business than do annuities.

The historical record with respect to the insurance of women
is also instructive. Coverage and rates charged to females changed
in response to changing experience, which is not consistent with a
belief that the rates were imposed in accordance with tastes and
opportunities for discrimination. Women were first offered life insurance by Equitable of England in 1762, but for an extra premium.

127

Following the general population studies in France, Swe-

den, and Switzerland that showed lower female mortality rates, the
English companies dropped the surcharge. But a joint survey in
1893 of their experience found higher female death rates, and the
extra premium was restored. An explanation for the unexpectedly
higher mortality among insured females was revealed by a United
States study of 400,000 female life and annuity policyholders insured between 1885 and 1908. Compared to the expected death
rates, the following actual rates were experienced for subgroups of
women: spinsters, 81%; widows and divorcees, 105%; and married
women, 119%. 128 The effects of adverse selection and moral hazard

were clear: "When unmarried women bought for themselves, endowments especially, they lived to collect. When married women
had insurance bought for them for others to collect, others did just
that-they collected. ' 12 9 Thereafter, insurers attempted to take

the self-interest of the insureds and beneficiaries into account, particularly when the policies were purchased by the beneficiaries. Estimates of the risk of death were based on more extensive and detailed statistical studies that considered the gender of insureds,
because experience had shown that this was a determinant of life
expectancy. There is no evidence indicating that the identification
of gender as a determinant was related to any prevailing stereotypes or other prejudices.
2. The Effect on Insurers of Not Using All Relevant Factors.
Let us assume, though, that insurers tend to use the insured's gen120

G.

BISHOP, CAPITAL FORMATION THROUGH LIFE INSURANCE

43 (1976). In 1974, life

insurance premiums paid to American life insurance companies were $278 billion, compared

with $7.7 billion for annuity considerations.
12I H. DINGMAN, RISK APPRAISAL 173-74 (2d ed. 1954).
128 Id. at 174.
129

Id.
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der as a determinant because of unwitting bias or unthinking conformity to past, no longer valid, practices. 13 0 The question is then
whether Justice Stevens was correct with respect to insurance
when he asserted that "[piractices that classify employees in terms
of religion, race, or sex tend to preserve traditional assumptions
about groups rather than thoughtful scrutiny of individuals.1

31

,

If

he were correct, insurers would be thoughtlessly giving up wealth
because they would be failing to recognize the benefits of using
more efficient predictors of life expectancy, and those who altered
their behavior appropriately would benefit at the expense of the
others. If, as Justice Stevens suggests, "a significant part of the
longevity differential may be explained by the social fact that men
are heavier smokers than women,"'3 2 and if this factor can be utilized efficiently,133 only insurers who preferred losses to wealth
would ignore it.
3. The Self-Interest of Employers and Employees. Even if
insurers generally are unconcerned with changes in their wealth,
the antidiscrimination statutes and the self-interest of employees
in obtaining a given level of annuity payments and service for the
least expenditure will prompt insurers to use information about insureds' life expectancies efficiently. Employers might want to pay
women less than men if the supply of women exceeds that of men,
all other things being equal, or if all employers have a taste for
discrimination. As discussed above, however, the employer could
not legally follow this practice if the benefits from a retirement
plan were correctly assessed, using sex-distinct mortality tables.3
If employers use pension contribution plans that define the contri1SOProfessor Brilmayer and her colleagues, supra note 15, apparently believe this to be

the case, though they offer nothing to support their belief. Rather, they simply state a truism-"The statement that some particular person is expected to live some certain number
of years is dependent on a prior decision about how to classify that person"-implying that

the decision is random or biased. Id. at 512 (footnote omitted). They then provide an example to show that the life expectancy at birth of people born in South Carolina differs from
that of the United States' population. Id. at 512-13. Aside from the lack of relevance of the
particular statistics presented (they should have reported life expectancy for retirees and
compared the data on males with data on females rather than with data on all persons),
they do not consider the reasons that insurers do not use place of birth for annuities. It is
not sufficient for them simply to show that alternative variables yield different mortality

rates; they must show that the alternatives yield efficient predictors or, at the least, more
accurate predictors.
"1 435 U.S. at 709.
132 Id. at 709-10 (footnote omitted).
133 See supra part II-B.
'34

See supra part III-A.
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butions to be made, but that permit their employees to purchase
their own individual annuity contracts under an arrangement administered on a group basis (such as the TIAA-CREF plan used by
higher educational institutions), the employees have a considerable
incentive to get the insurers to estimate life expectancies efficiently. Even if a plan is used in which benefits, rather than contributions, are set by some formula, the magnitude of pension benefits is such that employees have a similar incentive to get the most
for what is, in fact, their money. 13 5
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF

Manhart

In considering the possible effects on pension structures of a
legal prohibition against the use of sex-distinct mortality tables,
three situations are distinguishable: Manhart is limited only to direct, employer-operated pension plans; the decision is extended to
insurance companies (such as TIAA-CREF) that provide annuities
to employees; or the prohibition is extended to all annuities if purchased by an employee in the open market with employer-provided
funds.
A.

Implications for Employer-Operated Pension Plans

36
Some commentators, particularly Bernstein and Williams,'
express concern that prohibiting the use of sex-based mortality tables will increase the costs of employing females, thereby giving

131 Professor Brilmayer and her colleagues, supra note 15, at 531 n.125, dismiss the
effectiveness of market competition as follows: "the market has not even eliminated the
most blatant form of discrimination, the use of segregated tables for annuities and integrated tables for life insurance." Sex-distinct mortality tables are universally used for life
insurance, however. The authors must be referring to employee group life insurance, where
the premiums charged indirectly to the employee do not reflect the employee's age or gender, probably because the differences in amounts are not sufficient to warrant the administrative costs. But insurers charge employers on the bases of the ages and genders of the
actually insured employees. Thus, with respect to employer-sponsored individual plans, the
Society of Actuaries states: "Virtually all major insurance companies charge lower life insurance premiums for females than for males." Brief for the Society of Actuaries and the
American Academy of Actuaries as Amici Curiae at 25, City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Actuaries' Brief]. Professor Brilmayer and her colleagues continue: "Such market failures are not surprising. Competition is dulled because it
is enormously difficult for consumers to compare terms, or even the prices, of annuity and
life insurance contracts." Brilmayer group, supra note 15, at 531 n.125. But whether or not
consumers do competitive shopping, all insurance companies quote lower life insurance and
higher annuity rates for females at any given age, with some additional variation for other
factors, such as occupation.
"I Supra note 10, at 1212-13; supra note 13, at 1243-44.
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employers a strong incentive to discriminate against them in hiring. Consequently, they propose extending the prohibition to annuities generally. Before analyzing this proposal,13 7 I consider the
argument that the impact of unisex mortality tables on employeroperated plans, and therefore, on female employment, will be
slight.
Perhaps because she is an economist, Sydney J. Key provides
the most complete analysis of the implications of using merged tables. She claims that "[wjhile in theory, if all other things were
equal, the extra employer expense associated with greater female
longevity could become an incentive not to hire women, there are
several empirical reasons why this seems unlikely to occur." 13 8 One
is that the extra expense is not easily discerned, because "the sex
composition of the work force is far from being the only or even
one of the more important factors in pension plan funding, ' ' 139 and
the change made by the insurer is "an unallocated sum that is not
broken down by age or sex characteristics of the work force. 1 40 In
support of these descriptive statements, Key refers only to a note
in the Manhart amici curiae brief of the Society of Actuaries and
the American College of Actuaries, which merely states that in defined-benefit plans
it is not necessary, as it is under a defined contribution plan,
to establish individual accounts or to make contributions for
individual employees, so that the question of whether equal
contributions are being made for male and female employees,
while an 1appropriate one to ask, does not have as evident an
14
answer.
But on the same page, the brief notes:
[A]ctuaries must be able to continue to take the sex of employees into account in connection with their determination of
what probable costs must be borne by the employers under
[defined-benefit] plans.... In determining what contributions should be made [by employers], the actuary must take
account of the expected experience concerning mortality, disa-

"a

See infra part V-C.

Key, supra note 13, at 17-18.
139Id. at 18.
140 Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).
"

1'

Actuaries' Brief, supra note 135, at 19 n.16. See also 1 J.

supra note 27, at 356-61.

GREIDER

& W.

BEADLES,
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bility, turnover, salary increases and other factors which studies have shown differ by sex.142
Thus, the extra expense caused by paying female annuitants under
a unisex mortality table in a defined-benefits plan will be easily
discernible by employers.
In defined-contribution plans, amounts are contributed to the
individual account of each employee, and individual costs are of
course easily recognized. At present, "every insurance company offers to provide annuities in amounts that are different for men and
women if an identical single purchase payment is made.

' 143

If this

practice is considered to be illegal, the employer will have to contribute more for women than for similarly situated men. Hence,
under either type of plan, the employer forced to use a unisex mortality table must compensate women by greater amounts than
men; Key's notion that the added payments to females will not be
flagged is thus not supportable.
Key gives two other reasons for expecting that the greater retirement expense of hiring women will not act as an employment
disincentive. First, she argues that "the fact that female employees
generally have higher turnover rates than male employees may, to
some extent, offset the cost to the employer associated with extra
female longevity.

' 144

Of course, this is relevant only where the pen-

sion benefits have delayed vesting. But even in delayed-vesting
plans, these factors already are taken into account.1 45 Second, Key
argues that "[o]ver time the employer may be able to shift part or
all of the cost of extra female longevity to all employees either
through smaller increases in pension benefits or smaller increases
in net wages.

' 146

Consequently, she continues, compensation to

males in predominantly male work forces will be higher than compensation to males in mixed work forces, and men will have an
incentive to move into predominantly male and out of predominantly female work forces. But, she concludes, this type of movement is unlikely to be empirically important. She may be right or
wrong-no studies are cited. But if labor markets are not rigid and
Actuaries' Brief, supra note 135, at 19 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 25.
144 Key, supra note 13, at 18 (footnote omitted).
145 Actuaries' Brief, supra note 135, at 19 n.16. If the probability that female, as compared with male, employees will not obtain vested rights to pensions is not considered, however, Key is correct in pointing to this as a mitigating factor.
42

143

248

Key, supra note 13, at 19.
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markets are competitive, the usual economic analysis concludes
that the cost will be borne by the companies that are unable to
avoid the law by such tactics as attracting predominantly male
work forces or not offering retirement benefits. If these assumptions do not hold, the cost will be borne by male employees, investors, consumers, and unemployed females. In addition, there is a
dead-weight loss to society because resources are not employed in
their marginally most productive uses.
Key considers other possible reactions of male employees to be
more important. Though they might not change jobs, she says,
male employees may choose the option of receiving a lump sum on
retirement, or employers with predominantly male workers may
change annuity plans to achieve the same result. Thus, "although
for any given benefit plan the mortality experience of males and
females would be pooled, in practice the relevant mortality experience for a given option or plan would reflect a predominantly female group. ' ' 147 She concludes, though, that male employees are
unlikely to opt for lump sum payments if they cannot buy annuities, because of the risk they would have to assume.1 48 Key also
dismisses the option of switching to an insurance company that
uses sex-distinct tables because of "the high transactions cost associated with switching. ' ' 149 But she does not consider the incentives
to insurance companies of standardizing such switches for a large
group of male employees, perhaps through their union, fraternal,
or professional association, thereby reducing the transactions cost
below the benefit achieved by switching. Consequently, I find her
conclusion that female employment possibilities will not be adversely affected to be neither empirically nor analytically supported, unless the prohibition is nullified, in practice.
Assuming that the prohibition is effective, some other groups
not mentioned by Key are likely to be disadvantaged. The Manhart Court did not "call into question the insurance industry practice of considering the composition of an employer's work force in
determining the probable cost of a retirement. . plan. 15 0 Consequently, employers with a predominantly female work force will
have an incentive to establish defined-contribution plans with im147 Id.

at 21.
also could have mentioned the adverse tax consequences of a cash payout. See
I.R.C. § 402(e) (1976 & West Supp. 1981).
14BShe

,19 Key, supra note 13, at 22.
150 435 U.S. at 718 (footnote omitted).
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mediate vesting, in which event insurance companies will provide
annuities based on sex-distinct female tables, or forgo providing
pensions altogether. Both possibilities are socially costly, because
employers did not choose their present plans randomly, but for a
purpose explainable by such factors as the preferences of their employees and the characteristics of their industries. Those employees who prefer present cash payments to future retirement benefits-for example, young people-will benefit from forgoing
pensions but not from the use of female mortality tables.
B.

Implications of Extending Manhart to Insurance Companies
that Provide Individual Annuities to Employees (TIAA-CREF
Type of Plan)

Presently, litigants in a number of lawsuits are attempting to
have the pension plans offered by TIAA-CREF, the nonprofit association that provides pension and insurance services to employees
of higher educational institutions, brought under Manhart. They
base their suits on the argument that the insurer is an agent of the
educational institutions with which it is associated, and thus is as
subject as any employer to the decision. 5 1 If they are successful,
TIAA-CREF would be forbidden to use sex-distinct tables for calculating annuities. The consequences for individual annuitants can
be seen with the aid of the calculations presented in Table 5. For
this illustration the 1975 life expectancies of a female and a male
aged 65 (18.1 and 13.7 years) were used, $100,000 was assumed to
be the amount in each account, and the retirement fund was assumed to yield from 2% to 10% per year. As the table shows, the
higher the yield, the greater the annual payment amount, and the
less the difference between the expected single-sex female and
male payments (because the present value of an amount promised
a longer time in the future is less). Also assumed is a 50-50 mix of
female and male retirees, each of whom elects a life annuity with
no benefits to beneficiaries. The table shows that a 50-50 merged
gender (unisex) table would reduce the man's $100,000 investment
by between $11,802 and $5,984 (or his annual pension by from
11.8% to 6.0%) and increase the woman's by the same amount and
percentages. If the yields or life expectancies were greater, the effect of using a merged-gender table would decrease, and vice versa.
151 See cases cited supranote 7. For a clear statement of this position, see Van Alstyne,
supra note 39, at 150-55.
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Many employees elect to have the payments made to them or
to their survivor, whoever lives longer. 152 In this event, the longer
expected life of the two and the terms of the contract determine
how much is promised. But if the annuitant is, say, a male and his
wife is 4.4 years his junior, the life expectancy assumed in Table 5
is the same, and the calculations shown are not affected by a joint
option.
TABLE 5
EFFECT OF 50-50 MERGED GENDER TABLE ON EXPECTED ANNUAL PAYMENTS AND
PRESENT VALUES OF $100,000 INVESTMENT BY MALE AND FEMALE ANNUITANT

Net Yield on Investment
2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

Female Expected Annual
Payments (life
expectancy=18.1 years) a

$6,640

$7,869

$9,207

$10,643

$12,168

Male Expected Annual
Payments (life
expectancy=13.7 years) a

$8,417

$9,623

$10,911

$12,278

$13,717

Merged

5 0 -5 0 b

$7,423

$8,658

$9,987

$11,403

$12,896

Differences:
Merged minus female
Merged minus male

$783
-$994

$789
-$965

$780
-$924

$760
-$875

$728
-$821

$11,802

$10,027

$8,470

$7,134

$5,984

Increase in female and
decrease in male
investment (present values)

a 1975 expected lives at age 65 for United States white population.
b Calculated by assuming half males and half females (50-50), with female annual
amount expected to be-paid over 18.1 years and male annual amount over 13.7 years.

Faced with losses of expected wealth and income of the magnitudes given in Table 5, it seems likely that many male employees
of higher educational institutions (and similarly affected organizations) and their female survivors, if sufficiently younger than their
husbands, would attempt to find a better pension system. Insurance companies would have an incentive to offer retirement plans
152 Among TIAA-CREF's annuitants, 66% of the males and 18% of the females elected
joint and full, two-thirds, or half to survivor after the annuitant's death.
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to male-dominated institutions, thereby taking advantage of the
entirely legal practice of considering the sexual composition of a
group in calculating the probable cost of a retirement plan. 15 For
example, male-dominated Massachusetts Institute of Technology
might choose to have its own plan, perhaps restricted to teaching
personnel, while female-dominated Barnard College would not find
this option appealing.:5 4 Similarly, an association of tenured economics professors or licensed engineers might be formed and offer
a retirement plan that would be open to its members. Women
would not be barred from such an organization, although, as it
happens, relatively few women are tenured economics professors or
licensed engineers. If members of these male-dominated institutions and professions did not think of taking such actions to avoid
the effects of a merged-gender table, it seems likely that some insurer would see the profit opportunities and, in effect, do the organizing for them.
If higher educational institutions required their employees to
stay with TIAA-CREF, which offers considerable advantages of
portability, low administrative expenses, and familiarity, some
could still benefit by asking to use a merged-gender table that reflected the institution's actual female-male mix if this resulted in
higher payments to the employees. If this occurred, TIAA-CREF
would have to have a separate account for each institution at
which each participant had worked, raising costs and reducing
portability. As a consequence, some institutions might find it desirable to give the retirement amounts to the employees, who then
could purchase annuities directly or use the funds for other investments or present consumption.'55 The individuals would gain freedom of choice, but the institution would accept the risk that some
elderly employees might dissipate their savings and be in want or
find it difficult to retire.
The net effect of these changes would likely be greater freedom for some individuals but greater risk for the institutions,
higher retirement costs for most, and higher benefits to some women, particularly those with female survivors, but not to those who
are at least 4.4 years younger than their husbands. If TIAA-CREF
is ordered by the courts to use merged-gender tables on funds already contributed, as the litigants demand, the result will be a
See 435 U.S. at 718.
Key, supra note 13, at 24, recognizes this problem.
155 The University of Rochester does this now.
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transfer of considerable wealth from those males who have male,
younger female, or no designated survivors, to those females who
have female, older male, or no designated survivors. TIAA-CREF
estimates the amount of this transfer to be $2.1 billion.

5

Alterna-

tively, the institutions could contribute additional funds to "top
off" the females' existing annuity accounts so that their promised
periodic payments would equal those of similarly situated males.
But even assuming that the institutions could or would allocate
funds for this purpose and that the institutions at which the employees formerly were employed could be assessed their shares, the
institutions would be vulnerable to lawsuits by their male employ157
ees, who could plausibly charge them with sex discrimination.

Those employers, including most nonacademic firms, that do
not provide their employees with immediately vested, portable retirement funds, also can avoid the effects of the prohibition of sexdistinct mortality tables by opting for a trusteed, self-insurance
plan. Under such a plan, the employer would make annual contributions, usually deposited with a bank or trust company, in
amounts that an actuary calculated to be sufficient to pay the
promised pensions to his employee group. 158 Companies employing
'" For people retiring on and after January 1, 1982, based on the following assumptions: first, the negatively affected parties do not change the annuity elections that past
experience indicates they would make; and second, the rate of return on TIAA and CREF
investments are 9% and 7% before retirement and 9.5% and 4% thereafter, and the discount rate is zero (that is, future expected payments are summed). The first assumption
works to understate and the second to overstate the amount. Memorandum No. 3, Oct. 2,
1981, at 6, submitted by Rogers & Wells, Counsel to TIAA-CREF, to Hon. Timothy T.
Ryan, Solicitor, Department of Labor, in response to OFCCP Proposed Reg. § 60-1.21(c)(1),
46 Fed. Reg. 42,968, 42,985 (1981) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pt. 60) (proposed Aug. 25,
1981) (memorandum on file with University of Chicago Law Review).
M57
Albert Lewis, the New York Superintendent of Insurance, rejected TIAA-CREF's
application for approval of a unisex table on Jan. 27, 1981. He cited
three separate sections of New York law that would be violated by its adoption.
Describing the table as "unfair, unjust, inequitable and misleading," Mr. Lewis said the
use of a new mortality basis would discriminate against men because it "results in a
lower total income for males and a higher income benefit for females as compared to
the amount of total income which would have been payable had the sex-distinct basis
been retained."
"[T]he company has not reserved the contractual right to make unilateral
amendments as to age or sex. Without such right, the insurer cannot unilaterally modify these individual contracts as a matter of law where such change will discontinue the
use of age or sex as a basis for determining benefits."
Quoted in Fenske, supra note 105, at 14.
'" Actuaries' Brief, supra note 135, at A-7; 1 J. GREIDER & W. BEADLES, supra note 27,
at 357-58.
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mostly females, however, would benefit from purchasing coverage
from an insurance company because the insurer would have to use
a unisex table. Thus insurance companies, including TIAA-CREF,
would come to be dominated by female annuitants, shifting the
balance even further away from males. Referring to Table 5, if
75% of the annuitants were female and 25% were male, a male's
$100,000 retirement investment that yielded 6% would have a present value of $87,807, a decrease of 12.2% rather than the 8.5%
shown in Table 5 for a 50-50 mix.
Companies with relatively few employees probably could not
use a trusteed plan because random fluctuations in their actual experience could "break the bank." Hence, they would either have to
use an insurance company (if there were any that would still write
annuities under a mandated unisex mortality table), not offer
nonvested retirement benefits, and/or attempt to .employ fewer
females.
C.

Implications of Prohibiting the Use of Sex-Distinct Mortality
Tables for All Insurers

Some advocates of merged-gender tables, particularly Bernstein and Williams, recognize that if the Manhart decision is limited to employer-operated pension plans, the costs of employing
women would increase, thereby disadvantaging them. 15 9 Bernstein
and Williams therefore would not permit employers' self-insured
plans or insurance companies that provide employment-derived
annuities to consider the gender composition of the work force covered. They appear to want to require all retirement plans and annuities purchased for or by employees to use the same unisex mortality table.1 e0
Bernstein and Williams, almost alone among the commentators, correctly assess the extent to which sex-distinct mortality tables would have to be outlawed. But they do not carry their reasoning far enough. How can a trusteed, self-insurance plan be
required to use a universal unisex table if, as they admit, women
Bernstein & Williams, supra note 13, at 1243, note that
[w]hether [the employer] apportions the contributions equally among all employees or
actually contributes more for his female employees makes no difference; he knows that
his pension costs are higher because he employs women. Thus, he has a powerful disincentive to hiring women, which will obviously 'tend to deprive' them of employmen
opportpnities in violation of the statute.
160 Id. at 1246-47.
5I
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tend to live longer than men, and all the employer needs to do is
deposit enough funds to pay the promised pensions? In fact, as
they understand, the amount required will depend on the actual
male-female configuration of the potential retirees. And although
insurance companies might be required legally to use only a single
unisex table, assuming the McCarran-Ferguson Act""" is repealed
or amended or the states individually mandate a universal unisex
mortality table, 162 the effects of the legislation can be avoided by
allowing employees to invest their retirement funds as they see fit,
or by withdrawing the pension fringe benefit where the work force
is predominantly female. Of course, the prohibition against sexdistinct mortality tables could be applied throughout the insurance
industry, but then the result would also be significantly higher life
insurance premiums for females.'
Finally, the effects of adverse selection on the availability of
annuities and life insurance should be emphasized. It probably is
the case that the advantages of insurance are sufficient to overcome initially the disadvantages to males of a mandated unisex
mortality table for annuities and to females for life insurance, particularly when administrative costs are reduced by group purchase
by or through an employer. But as some males forgo annuities and
some females, life insurance, the disadvantages to those remaining
increase. At the same time, more females will find it advantageous
to buy annuities, and males to buy life insurance. This destructive
effect of adverse selection has previously been experienced by insurers.'" There is no reason to believe that it will not happen
again.
CONCLUSION

In Manhart, Justice Stevens wrote that "we do not suggest
that [Title VII] was intended to revolutionize the insurance and
pension industries. All that is at issue today is a requirement [by
the employer] that men and women make unequal contributions to
-6-15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
162 The author of the Columbia Comment, supra note 10, at 1398, notes that "[fln none
of these states [with equal rights amendments to their constitutions] have premium rate
differentials [based on the gender of the insured] been abolished" (footnote omitted).
163The Nondiscrimination in Insurance Bill, H.R. 100, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG.
Rac. H25 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1981), if enacted, would do just this. Support for it appears to
have diminished when the effect on life insurance premiums payable by women was realized.
I See, e.g., Bailey group, supra note 10, at 784-85.
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an employer-operated pension fund."1 '5 Unfortunately, Justice
Stevens misunderstood the economics of pension benefits and exhibited considerable naivet6. The value to an individual employee
of a pension benefit given in the present period as compensation is
measured by the present value of the expected stream of promised
payments plus the utility to the person of avoiding the effects of
risk. This expectation is a function of the individual's life expectancy. As discussed above, there is considerable evidence that a
person's gender is a valid and useful predictor of that person's life
expectancy. To forbid use of this predictor is to discriminate unfairly. The Attorney General of the state of Washington recognized
this problem in an opinion; citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,1 6 he
stated: "equality of treatment may be denied as much by equal
by
application of a single standard to persons unequally situated as
1 7
application of unequal standards to persons equally situated. ,
If this admonition is disregarded, and the use of sex-distinct
mortality tables in employment-related pensions is prohibited,
workers are likely to be denied the benefits of annuities or will
have to pay the higher costs of alternative arrangements. If these
costs would purchase benefits for a disadvantaged group, or if they
alleviated the invidious treatment of women or another group that
has been discriminated against unfairly, the change might be considered worthwhile. But such would not be the case in this situation. If Manhart is extended, the result not only will be unfair discrimination against individuals because of gender, but the
potential destruction of annuities and life insurance, as the inexorable effects of adverse selection work their havoc.

160
435 U.S. at 717.
-66401 U.S. 424 (1971).
1671973 Op. Wash. Att'y Gen. No. 21.

